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INTRODUCTION
As much as Americans love sugar, overconsumption can turn
something so sweet into something deadly.
Excessive sugar
consumption is linked to obesity and an increased risk of heart
disease.1 The rise in obesity rates is clearly correlated with the
increase of sugar in the American diet—between 1980 and 1990,
United States obesity rates rose parallel to increases in the production
of sugar in the food supply, with similar trends continuing into the
twenty-first century.2 Obesity is a serious condition that can cause
severe health problems3 and even death.4 Additionally, the estimated
direct and indirect costs of obesity have risen to a staggering $190
billion each year.5 Some experts adamantly assert that sugar is the
cause of obesity and advocate that a reduction in sugar intake could
have significant health benefits within the United States.6

1. Allison Aubrey, PepsiCo Pledges to Cut Sugar As Big Soda Comes Under
Scrutiny, NPR (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/10/17/
498274851/pepsico-pledges-to-cut-sugar-as-big-soda-comes-under-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/E3W2-BMBM]. See generally Kimber L. Stanhope,

Sugar
The State of the Controversy,
LAB. SCI. 52 (Sept. 17, 2015); Gary Taubes, Is Sugar

Consumption, Metabolic Disease and Obesity:

CRITICAL REVS. IN CLINICAL
Toxic?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
04/17/magazine/mag-17Sugar-t.html [https://perma.cc/K9LM-5RB4].
2. MARION NESTLE, SODA POLITICS: TAKING ON BIG SODA AND WINNING 42-43
(2015).
3. Obesity increases an individual’s risk of—and may even cause—coronary
heart disease, high blood pressure, stroke, type 2 diabetes, abnormal blood fats,
metabolic syndrome, cancer (specifically colon, breast, endometrial, and gallbladder
cancers), osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, obesity hypoventilation syndrome, reproductive
problems, and gallstones. Health Risks of Being Overweight, NAT’L INST. OF
DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/healthinformation/weight-management/health-risks-overweight
[https://perma.cc/APF72BXF].
4. In 2000, the Journal of the American Medical Association found that obesity
caused 400,000 deaths. Samuel J. Romero, Obesity Liability: A Super-Sized Problem
or a Small Fry in the Inevitable Development of Product Liability?, 7 CHAP. L. REV.
239, 241 (2004) (citing Alit H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United
States, 2000, 291 JAMA 1238, 1238-40 (2004)).
5. In 2001, the Surgeon General estimated the direct and indirect costs of obesity
were approximately $117 billion a year. Romero, supra note 4, at 241 (citing OFF. OF
THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND
DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 10 (2001), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK44206/ [https://perma.cc/6WD5-FNSJ]). Economists in 2012 estimated
the cost at $190 billion per year. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD
INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 393 (2002) (citing J. Cawley & C.
Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instrumental Variables
Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219-30 (2012)).
6. See generally Taubes, supra note 1.
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Dr. William Dietz, a preventative health expert at George
Washington University, explains that “[w]e know that sugar intake is
an important contributor to obesity, and . . . soft drinks and soda and
juices are a major source of sugar calories.”7 As a major source of
sugar calories, sodas alone account for one third of daily American
sugar consumption8 and, therefore, reducing soda consumption is a
meaningful way to reduce sugar intake. For example, a single twelve
ounce can of Coca-Cola contains thirty-nine grams of sugar (or ten
sugar cubes), approximately 156 and 108 percent of the daily
recommended sugar intake that the American Heart Association
(“AHA”) recommends for women and men, respectively.9 Sodas
pose various health risks, as the ingredients in soda, most notably
sugar, are linked to a number of health conditions, including “obesity,
type 2 diabetes, coronary artery disease, stroke dental disease, bone
disease, gout, asthma, cancers, rheumatoid arthritis, behavioral
problems, [and possibly] addiction.”10 While many believe diet is an
individual choice, large food corporations, including big soda
companies, have undue influence over how society views nutrition,
diet, and their specific products.11 Individuals and governments
should hold these large corporations, and specifically soda companies,
accountable for creating products that contain extreme levels of
sugar. Only then will the companies be forced to acknowledge the
inherently dangerous qualities of their products and modify them to
create a safer dietary environment for children and adults alike.
Data shows that certain populations are more likely to drink
regular soda (with large amounts of sugar) and are therefore more

7. Aubrey, supra note 1; see also Editorial Board, Mexico’s Soda Tax Success,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-08/
mexico-s-soda-tax-success [https://perma.cc/8ZAM-NXGX] (“Sugary drinks are
among the primary drivers of obesity.”).
8. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 42.
9. The American Heart Association recommends men consume no more than
nine teaspoons (or thirty-six grams) of added sugar a day and women consume no
more than six teaspoons (or twenty-five grams) of added sugar a day. Sugar 101, AM.
HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/HealthyLiving/HealthyEating/
Nutrition/Sugar-101_UCM_306024_Article.jsp#.WBwo6OErJ-U
[https://perma.cc/FC7G-JF65] (last updated Oct. 11, 2016).
10. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64.
11. See generally NESTLE, supra note 5. D. Mark Hegsted, one of the scientists
paid by the Sugar Association to play down the link between sugar and adverse
health effects, became the head of nutrition at the United States Department of
Agriculture and helped draft the federal government’s dietary guidelines in 1977.
Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
12,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-industryshifted-blame-to-fat.html [https://perma.cc/TV4P-KTE9].
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vulnerable to the significant health risks noted above.12 The
Beverage Marketing Corporation13 routinely collects information
about soda consumers and analyzes consumption within certain
demographic groups.14 This data shows that blue-collar workers and
those earning less than $10,000 engage in “higher-than-average soda”
intake than the overall population.15
Hispanic and African
Americans also consume more soda and exhibit an increased
occurrence of obesity and type 2 diabetes than white Americans.16
Approximately seventy percent of Hispanic and African Americans
reported routinely drinking regular (sugar-sweetened) sodas, and
these populations are more likely to consume regular soda when
compared to the overall population.17 These figures, taken together,
paint a clear picture—minority populations living in low-income areas
are more likely to engage in overconsumption of soda, and therefore
have increased exposure to the resulting health dangers.18
The soda industry’s intentional marketing practices, not individual
choice, create this increased risk. First, the soda industry specifically
targets Hispanic and African American communities.19 Both Pepsi
and Coca-Cola market to these populations and also use seemingly
charitable contributions to form relationships with these
communities.20 Many leaders within the Hispanic and African

12. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 34-35.
13. The Beverage Marketing Corporation provides consulting, research, and
advisory services to the food and beverage industries. See Who We Are, BEVERAGE
MKTG. CORP., https://www.beveragemarketing.com/who-we-are.asp [https://perma.cc/
VV6N-AMCA].
14. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 34-35.
15. Individuals with a yearly income of less than $10,000 are sixteen percent more
likely to consume regular soda than the overall population. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 186.
17. Hispanics and African Americans are twenty-one and thirteen percent more
likely, respectively, to consume regular soda. Id. at 35, 186.
18. These dangers will be discussed in detail in infra Part II.
19. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 185. The Hispanic Institute’s president, Gus West
stated, “[o]f course, we’re responsible for what we eat and drink . . . but we’re also
subject to the effects of massive advertising and misleading promotional campaigns—
especially on our children and the poor.” Id.
20. Soda companies target Hispanic children by advertising on Spanish-language
television and by using Spanish-speaking celebrities. These companies use similar
tactics when advertising to African American children featuring African American
celebrities. In addition to targeted television advertisements, soda companies also
produce print publications aimed at promoting cultural values. Id. at 194-95.
Additionally, soda companies promote brand loyalty through seemingly
philanthropic foundations that now appear to be further marketing techniques that
are manipulative rather than beneficial for these minority communities. Id. at 194-96.
When journalists and leaders within these communities receive funding or
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communities have noticed, and have begun distancing themselves and
denouncing soda companies.21 These leaders recognize that health
concerns relating to obesity are blighting their communities and place
significant blame on the soda companies.22 Second, these minority
communities are not choosing increased exposure to soda and the
health risks contained therein. Those living in low-income, urban
populations often have limited or no access to healthy food options.23
Even when minority populations living in urban areas have physical
access to fresh and healthy foods, low-income individuals may not be
able to afford the often hefty and unattainable price tag.24
Ultimately, through limited access to healthy alternatives and the
specific targeting of minority groups, these often urban populations
are more susceptible to overconsumption and are more vulnerable to
the health risks indicated by consuming large amounts of sugary
sodas.25
Therefore, minority and urban communities are
disproportionately impacted by the dangerous health risks inherent in
overconsumption of sugary sodas.26
This Note addresses the current health risks that can arise from
consuming large or excessive volumes of sugary sodas and offers legal
proposals to prevent further harm. Section I.A provides background
information about the current public health crisis related to the rise in
obesity and diabetes among Americans. Section I.B offers insight
into the use of sugar by large food corporations. Section I.C describes
Big Soda’s intentional use of sugar within its products. Part II
philanthropic gifts, these individuals can hardly be expected to write stories or
publicly criticize soda companies for creating products that contribute to the poor
health in their communities. Id. at 196.
21. The Hispanic Institute of Washington, D.C. in 2013 urged its Hispanic
constituents to cease collaboration with soda companies. Id. at 185.
22. West urged community organizations to “walk away from funding by the
processed food and big sugary drink companies,” demonstrating a break with soda
companies similar to many Hispanic organizations’ break in the 1990s with tobacco
companies. Id.
23. SARAH TREUHAFT & ALLISON KARPYN, POL’YLINK & FOOD TR., THE
GROCERY GAP: WHO HAS ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS 7
(2010),
http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/media_items/grocerygap.original.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N34S-J5JR]; see also INST. OF MED., ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN
OBESITY PREVENTION 3 (2012).
24. Many Americans living in low-income urban areas are concerned with
whether they will eat, rather than the nutritional value of what they will eat. SASHA
ABRAMSKY, BREADLINE USA: THE HIDDEN SCANDAL OF AMERICAN HUNGER AND
HOW TO FIX IT 14 (2011). Unfortunately, “unhealthy diets cost less, while the
recommended healthier diets cost more.” Adam Drewnowski, Obesity, Diets, and
Social Inequalities, 67 NUTRITION REV. S36, S37 (2009).
25. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 35-36, 185-86.
26. Id.
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examines potential approaches to addressing the current health
concerns, including the effectiveness of federal and state
governments, past food litigation, and finally reviews the success of
previous tobacco litigation. Part III identifies the most successful
avenues and legal theories that will best protect consumers in future
years.
I. HOW COULD SOMETHING SO SWEET BE SO DANGEROUS?
The current health crisis did not develop overnight. Since 1958, the
percentage of Americans diagnosed with diabetes rose by 700
percent.27 This rise in diabetes is not disappearing anytime soon, as
one in three Americans born after 2000 will be diagnosed with earlyonset diabetes.28 Additionally, since 1980 the percentage of the
United States’ population that is obese has increased.29 Both obesity
and diabetes pose serious health risks, and are largely preventable by
eating a healthy diet.30 Obesity and diabetes are serious health
conditions in themselves, but they also increase the likelihood of
metabolic syndrome, coronary heart disease, and even cancer, among
other diseases.31 In addition to the serious health concerns posed by
the rise in obesity, this disease poses significant economic costs. In
2001, the estimated annual direct and indirect cost of obesity was $117
and rose to $190 billion a year in 2012.32

27. In 1958, 1.58 million people, less than one percent of the United States
population, were diagnosed with diabetes. Since then, these statistics have risen
dramatically. As of 2015, over 23.35 million people, comprising 7.4 percent of the
United States’ population, have been diagnosed with diabetes. CDC, LONG-TERM
TRENDS IN DIABETES (Apr. 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/slides/
long_term_trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT46-LF8S].
28. FOOD, INC. (Robert Kenner 2009).
29. In 2014, 28.9 percent of adults were obese (up from 28.4 percent in 2011) and
approximately twenty-two million adults have been diagnosed with diabetes (in 1980,
5.5 million adults were diagnosed with diabetes). In 2013, 13.7 percent of adolescents
were obese (up from 11.8 percent in 2009). CDC, Nutrition, Physical Activity and
Obesity:
Data, Trends and Maps, https://nccd.cdc.gov/NPAO_DTM/Location
Summary.aspx?statecode=94 [https://perma.cc/4NUW-MQNA].
30. Obesity and Overweight, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ [https://perma.cc/TW2V-JQLH] (last updated June
2016); Diabetes is Preventable, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY
DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-communication-prog
rams/ndep/am-i-at-risk/diabetes-preventable/Pages/diabetesispreventable.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XN9G-E9A6].
31. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64-73.
32. Romero, supra note 4, at 241 (citing OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT
AND OBESITY 10 (2001)); see also NESTLE, supra note 5, at 393.
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As obesity rates and the number of Americans diagnosed with type
2 diabetes have increased in recent decades, so too has the
consumption of sugar within the United States.33 This correlation has
led many researchers and experts to conclude that overconsumption
of sugar is linked to obesity and diabetes, two health and diet related
diseases.34 In addition to sugars in everyday foods, sweetened sodas
interact differently with the body.35 Some scholars believe that
consuming sugar through soda leads to sugar overconsumption, and
therefore sodas are a large cause of the obesity epidemic.36
A. The Problem with Sugar
Sugar, in moderation, is a perfectly acceptable part of any
nutritious diet.37 The issue is what constitutes an excessive amount or
an overconsumption of sugar that can reach a dangerous level. The
risk of heart disease death begins to increase when fifteen percent of
daily calories come from added sugars and increases significantly
above that fifteen-percentage threshold.38 With that in mind, “[i]n
the United States, children are said to consume an average of 16
percent of their daily calories from sugars added to foods and drinks,
and adults 13 percent.”39
Considered in pounds of sugar per person per year, by the early
twenty-first century, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
calculated that on average, Americans consumed over ninety pounds
per person per year.40 Further demonstrating the mass availability of
sugar, in 2011, the U.S. supply produced domestically (less exports,

33. See Aubrey, supra note 1. “This correlation between sugar consumption and
diabetes is what defense attorneys call circumstantial evidence. It’s more compelling
than it otherwise might be, though, because the last time sugar consumption jumped
markedly in this country, it was also associated with a diabetes epidemic.” Taubes,
supra note 1, at 8.
34. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 60-63; Stanhope, supra note 1; Taubes,
supra note 1.
35. See NESTLE, supra note 2, at 47; Taubes, supra note 1.
36. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-48, 64-69; NESTLE, supra note 5, at
405-06.
37. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38. “Dr. Robert Lustig, a pediatric endocrinologist
concerned about the effects of sugars on children’s health, calls sugar a poison,
although one directly related to dose. A dose of up to 50 grams a day, he says, poses
little risk.” Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Taubes, supra note 1, at 7-8 (noting that in 1986, the USDA estimated that
Americans were consuming seventy-five pounds of sugar per capita yearly,
representing an increase of sugar consumption).
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plus imports) totaled nearly 132 pounds per capita.41 Both domestic
and global health organizations recommend a much smaller daily
sugar intake.42 The AHA recommends men consume no more than
nine teaspoons (or thirty-six grams) of added sugar a day and women
consume no more than six teaspoons (or twenty-five grams) of added
sugar a day.43 In pounds, the AHA recommends men and women
consume approximately twenty-nine and twenty pounds of sugar
annually, roughly one third of the current average consumption.44
Globally, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) strongly
recommends that both children and adults reduce their daily sugar45
consumption to less than ten percent of total calories.46 While many
authorities agree on the ten percent (or approximately fifty gram)
daily sugar recommendation, Dr. Lustig, a pediatric endocrinologist,
asserts that consuming twice the recommended “dose” of sugar can
prove toxic.47 Putting things in perspective, a single twelve ounce can
of regular Coca Cola contains thirty-nine grams of sugar and a twelve
ounce can of Pepsi contains forty-one grams of sugar, both of which
exceed the AHA daily recommendation for sugar consumption for
both men and women.48
Because sodas only account for

41. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 41-42 (noting that “67 pounds of cane and beet
sugars (sucrose), 47 pounds of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), and the rest from
honey, maple syrup, and other such sources.”).
42. “[M]ost health authorities recommending consuming no more than 10 percent
of calories from added sugars per day.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38.
43. AM. HEART ASS’N, supra note 9.
44. Id. “By the early 2000s, according to the U.S.D.A., we had increased our
[sugar] consumption to more than 90 pounds per person per year.” Taubes, supra
note 1, at 7-8.
45. “Free sugars include monosaccharides and disaccharides added to foods and
beverages by the manufacturer, cook or consumer, and sugars naturally present in
honey, syrups, fruit juices and fruit juice concentrates.” WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
GUIDELINE: SUGARS INTAKE FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN 16 (2015), http://apps.who.
int/iris/bitstream/10665/149782/1/9789241549028_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KXF9SWQ7].
46. Id.
47. Nestle notes “Dr. Lustig’s 100-gram toxic dose is close to the upper level of
nutritional safety—25 percent of total calories—proposed in 2002 by the Institute of
Medicine”; however, the Institute of Medicine intended that percentage as the upper
limit for safety purposes and was not intended to represent a recommendation.
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 38.
48. Product Facts, COCA-COLA, http://www.coca-colaproductfacts.com/en/cocacola-products/coca-cola/ [https://perma.cc/SYU2-YMFP]; The Facts About Your
Favorite Beverages: Pepsi, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsicobeveragefacts.com/Home/
product?formula=35005*26*01-01&form=RTD&size=12
[https://perma.cc/Y68APSTC] (last updated Mar. 23, 2017). One twelve ounce can of Coca-Cola represents
approximately 156 and 108 percent of the American Heart Association’s daily added
sugar recommendation for women and men, respectively. One twelve ounce can of
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approximately one third of Americans’ daily added sugar
consumption, even limiting soda consumption to a single serving a
day would still likely result in consuming more than the daily
recommendation.49 Obesity and sugar consumption are intrinsically
connected and overconsumption of sugar can often result in obesity
as well as associated health risks.50
B.

What Makes Soda So Bad?

One common question is “what makes soda so bad?” First and
foremost, despite the common misconception, all calories are not
created equal. A calorie is not simply a calorie.51 Due to its liquid
form, soda rapidly delivers large amounts of sugar to the blood
stream.52 Soda calories are empty calories devoid of any nutritional
benefit.53 Studies have further found that consumption of sugar
through liquid form bypasses the psychological regulatory system
controlling appetite and food intake in rats and mice.54 This means
the brain does not communicate with the rest of the body that it is
full.55 Furthermore, soda (and other processed foods) is specifically
formulated so that human taste buds are not overwhelmed with any
single flavor in the product.56
Soda and processed food
Pepsi represents approximately 164 and 114 percent of the American Heart
Association’s daily added sugar recommendation for women and men, respectively.
AM. HEART ASS’N, supra note 9.
49. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 42.
50. From 1980 to the late 1990s, “obesity rose in parallel to the increasing
production of sugars in the food supply.” Id. at 43; Taubes, supra note 1, at 8. As
Judge Sweet noted in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., “studies have shown that both
modest and large weight gains are associated with significantly increased risk of
diseases.” 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
51. As Dr. Robert Lustig explains, when you consume 160 calories in almonds,
the food will not be absorbed into the body immediately because the fiber in the
almonds will not be absorbed immediately. Therefore, the body’s blood sugar will
rise more slowly. Dr. Lustig goes on to contrast the almond with 160 calories of a soft
drink. “Because there is no fiber [in the soda, the calories] get absorbed straight
through the portal system to the liver. The liver gets this big sugar rush. When your
liver gets that onslaught, it has no choice but to turn it into fat immediately.” FED UP
(Stephanie Soechtig 2014).
52. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45; Taubes, supra note 1, at 6.
53. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46 (“Some studies of human eating behavior
support this idea: the more sugary drinks people consume, the more calories they
consume from any source.”).
54. “Most research suggests that it is only the sugars consumed in drinks that
bypass physiological regulatory controls.” Id. at 46.
55. MICHAEL MOSS, SALT, SUGAR, FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US 9899 (2013). High levels of insulin caused by consumption of soda also block your brain
from receiving the signal that you are full. See FED UP, supra note 51.
56. MOSS, supra note 55, at 105.
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manufacturers encourage overconsumption with products that bypass
the psychological regulatory system controlling appetite, and they
utilize a formula that will not overwhelm the consumer.57 In humans,
studies have shown that “the more sugary drinks people consume, the
more calories they consume from any source.”58 Individuals who
drink soda are at risk of consuming too many calories on a daily basis
without gaining any nutritional benefit from the empty soda calories.
Soda is also particularly problematic, because fructose (which
usually makes up at least half of the sweeteners in sodas), unlike
glucose or sucrose, is metabolized almost completely in the liver.59
Although a hundred calories of glucose is the same number of
calories as a hundred calories of sugar (half glucose, half fructose),
the metabolic consequences are different.60 Because fructose is
metabolized solely by the liver, any sudden increase in fructose could
overwhelm liver function.61 In response to the fructose, the body, and
specifically the pancreas, creates insulin to maintain blood sugar
levels.62 While the pancreas is generally capable of managing
reasonable rises in blood sugar, when blood sugar is consistently and
rapidly rising, it cannot keep up with the demand.63 At this point the
body is suffering “pancreatic exhaustion,” as the pancreas can no
longer create the necessary insulin to control the body’s blood sugar
levels, and the individual now has diabetes.64 Additionally, “[w]hen
fructose is consumed in excessive amounts, it is converted to fat in the
liver and causes a rise in levels of blood triglycerides.”65 Studies
suggest there is an association between added fructose, such as the
57. Id. at 104-06.
58. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46.
59. Id. at 47; Taubes, supra note 1, at 5; see also FED UP, supra note 51 (“[W]hen
your liver is pushed to the max the pancreas comes to the rescue by creating excess
amounts of a hormone called insulin . . . [and] insulin [then] turns sugar into fat for
storage. That’s insulin’s job.”).
60. Taubes, supra note 1, at 5.
61. Id. at 6.
In animals, or at least in laboratory rats and mice, it’s clear that if the
fructose hits the liver in sufficient quantity and with sufficient speed, the
liver will convert much of it to fat. This apparently induces a condition
known as insulin resistance, which is now considered the fundamental
problem in obesity, and the underlying defect in heart disease and in the
type of diabetes, type 2, that is common to obese and overweight
individuals. It might also be the underlying defect in many cancers.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id.
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fructose found in sodas, and metabolic problems, including
“metabolic syndrome,” a condition known to raise the risk of heart
disease and type 2 diabetes.66 These health conditions are discussed
in greater detail in Section I.C.
Another issue unique to soda is the possibility that, due to the
combination of certain ingredients, it may be addictive.67 The
scientific evidence supporting this is still being developed, and this
topic is discussed at greater length in Part III. Ultimately, because
sodas contribute such a significant percentage of daily sugar in the
American diet, “they raise the same concerns as sugar alone.”68
Therefore, many of the concerns related to general overconsumption
of sugar can be applied to the overconsumption of soda.
C.

Soda and the Obesity Crisis

Between 1980 and 2000, production of soda rose from twenty-seven
gallons per person a year to over forty gallons per person a year.69
Along with this notable rise in soda production, obesity rates in the
United States doubled from fifteen percent to approximately thirty
percent of the population.70 Additionally, the prevalence of obesity
among specific population groups closely aligns with their patterns of
soda consumption.71 In 2012, over one hundred health groups and
individuals urged the Surgeon General in a press release to produce a
report concerning soda consumption, similar to the Surgeon
General’s reports on smoking in previous decades:
Soda and other sugary drinks are the only food or beverage that has
been directly linked to obesity, a major contributor to coronary
heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes, and some cancers, and a cause
66. Id. (citing Trevor J. Carden & Timothy P. Carr, Food Availability of Glucose
and Fat, But Not Fructose, Increased in the U.S. between 1970 and 2009: Analysis of
the USDA Food Availability Data System, 12 NUTRITION J. 130 (2013)). As Gary
Taubes explains,
[c]onsuming sugar (fructose and glucose) means more work for the liver
than if you consumed the same number of calories of starch (glucose). And
if you take that sugar in liquid form—soda or fruit juices—the fructose and
glucose will hit the liver more quickly than if you consume them, say, in an
apple (or several apples, to get what researchers would call the equivalent
dose of sugar). The speed with which the liver has to do its work will also
affect how it metabolizes the fructose and glucose.
Taubes, supra note 1.
67. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 49.
68. Id. at 45.
69. Id. at 67.
70. Id.
71. “Both soda consumption and obesity are highest among African and Hispanic
Americans, followed by whites and Asians.” Id.
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of psychosocial problems . . . . Yet, each year, the average American
drinks about 40 gallons of sugary drinks, all with little, if any,
nutritional benefit.72

It is helpful to look at other health problems to further understand
the causal connection between soda consumption and obesity.
Research pertaining to childhood obesity presents glaring evidence
that children who habitually drink soda consume more calories, have
worse eating habits, and ultimately weigh more than children who do
not.73 Consuming even a single additional soda in a child’s daily diet
increases the chance of becoming overweight.74 Further emphasizing
the concerns of childhood obesity and soda consumption, the 2010
Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee concluded that children
should be discouraged from consuming sugar-sweetened beverages.75
Research has shown that sodas are linked to poor diets. Although
sodas contain many ingredients:
Studies often link one or another ingredient in soda, mostly sugars,
to a broad array of chronic health conditions, most notably obesity,
type 2 diabetes and coronary heart disease, but also stroke, dental
disease, bone disease, gout, asthma, cancers, rheumatoid arthritis,
behavioral problems, and even psychological disorders and
premature aging, not to mention addiction.76

Most independent research—funded by grants from government
agencies or private foundations—similarly concluded that habitual
soda consumption is not good for an individual’s health.77
Sodas contain large amounts of sugar78 that are metabolized in a
particularly harmful way. Because soda delivers the sugar (fructose)
in liquid form, it floods the body’s metabolic system, thereby
exacerbating the already harmful effect of sugar consumption.79
Additionally, soda’s formula encourages and likely causes
overconsumption of sugar on a daily basis.80 Based on the large

72. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06 (citation omitted).
73. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 67.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 64-65. It is important to note that the soda industry sponsors its own
research studies, but “practically all studies reporting adverse effects of sodas on
health were funded by grants from government agencies or private foundations.” Id.
at 65.
77. Id. at 66.
78. COCA-COLA, supra note 48; PEPSICO, supra note 48.
79. For a full description of soda’s metabolic effect, see discussion supra Section
I.B.
80. MOSS, supra note 55, at 98-99, 104-06. See also discussion supra Section I.B.
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amounts of sugar in soda and the correlation between soda
consumption and obesity, many authorities have asserted that soda is
a major cause of the current obesity crisis.81 Beyond scholastic and
scientific analyses, a former president of the North and South
America division in Coca-Cola admits:
The obesity trend is an epidemic, [a]nd there is no question its roots
are directly tied to the expansion of fast food, junk food, and soft
drink consumption. Whether you can identify any one of those
things is probably a fair question. Soft drink guys prospect on that
all the time. But you can look at the obesity rates, and you can look
at per capita consumption of sugary soft drinks and overlap those on
a map, and I promise you: They correlate about .99999 percent. 82

Soda consumption is significant, real, dangerous, and expensive to
the American consumer. Given the rise in diseases that are
connected to sugar consumption, and more specifically soda
consumption, research should begin exploring the role of sugary
sodas in the obesity and diabetes epidemics.
D. Sugar versus Fat: How the Food Companies Sculpted the Public
Health Narrative
Through funding research and lobbying, the food industry
consistently seeks to influence domestic nutrition guidelines to
benefit companies in the industry.83 As a general matter, studies
suggest that industry-funded research may favorably bias the findings
towards the industry providing funding.84 In fact, “[a] recent analysis
of beverage studies . . . found that those funded by Coca-Cola, Pepsi,
the American Beverage Association and the sugar industry were five
times more likely to find no link between sugar drinks and weight
gain than studies whose authors reported no financial conflicts.”85
Recently uncovered documents from the sugar industry “suggest that
five decades of research into the role of nutrition and heart disease,
including many of today’s dietary recommendations, have been
largely shaped by the sugar industry.”86 Specifically, the Sugar

81. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06.
82. MOSS, supra note 55, at 100.
83. See Romero, supra note 4, at 242 (citing NESTLE, supra note 5, at 67-92); see
generally MOSS, supra note 55.
84. See Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for
Obesity Away From Bad Diets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.
com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blame-for-obesity-away-frombad-diets/ [https://perma.cc/Y4TU-EZ29].
85. Id.
86. O’Connor, supra note 11.
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Association (then called the Sugar Research Association) paid
Harvard scientists in 1967 to publish a review on sugar, fat, and heart
disease to debunk contemporaneous anti-sugar studies in Europe
conducted by sugar critic, John Yudkin.87 The industry-funded
research was likely in response to Yudkin’s88 research and
experiments surrounding the health effects of sugar consumption,
including higher triglyceride levels associated with heart disease and
increased insulin levels directly linked with type 2 diabetes.89
Realizing that this research could threaten the sugar industry, John
Hickson, a top executive in the sugar industry, proposed disputing the
worrying findings on sugar with industry-funded research.90
In addition to research funding, the uncovered documents suggest
that the researchers were in relatively close contact with executives
while conducting the studies.91 The hired scientists shared and
reviewed early drafts with sugar industry executives, and Hickson
himself expressed satisfaction with the content of their presented
writings.92 One of the researchers even assured Hickson that “[w]e
are well aware of your particular interest and will cover this as well as
we can.”93 The particular interest, of course, was to shift public
opinion and minimize the link between sugar and heart health by
instead emphasizing the role of fat and saturated fat in cardiovascular
problems.94
The industry-funded research successfully minimized the criticism
of sugar and shifted the focus to fat.95 In 1976, the Sugar Association
won the Silver Anvil award (a public relations award) for “influencing
the public opinion about the health effects of sugar consumption.”96
The industry-funded research was published in the New England

87. Id.
88. John Yudkin was a leading authority on nutrition in the United Kingdom.
Taubes, supra note 1, at 5.
89. In the mid-1960s, “studies had begun pointing to a relationship between highsugar diets and the country’s high rates of heart disease . . . [and a top sugary industry
executive] proposed countering the alarming findings on sugar with industry-funded
research.” Marion Nestle also explained that the recently uncovered documents
“provided ‘compelling evidence’ that the sugar industry had initiated research
‘expressly to exonerate sugar as a major risk factor for coronary heart disease.’”
O’Connor, supra note 11; see also Taubes, supra note 1, at 5.
90. O’Connor, supra note 11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. SUGAR COATED (Michele Hozer 2015).
96. Id.
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Journal of Medicine, a prominent journal that authorities rely on
when shaping the overall scientific discussion.97 One of the Harvard
scientists, D. Mark Hedsted, became the head of nutrition at the
USDA and used the research funded by the sugar industry to
“influence the government’s dietary recommendations,” emphasizing
saturated fat as the leading cause of cardiovascular disease while
identifying sugar as “empty” or benign calories.98 More generally, the
results of the industry-funded research has had long-term impact for
both dietary guidelines and general nutrition policy where “[f]or
many decades, health officials encouraged Americans to reduce their
fat intake, which led many people to consume low-fat, high-sugar
foods that some experts now blame for fueling the obesity crisis.”99
Coca-Cola recently came under criticism for funding scientists who
shift blame for obesity from bad diets to lack of exercise.100 The
largest soda company collaborated with influential scientists
advocating the message, “to maintain a healthy weight, get more
exercise and worry less about cutting calories,” in journals, at
conferences, and through social media.101 This message is misleading
and a thinly veiled attempt by Coca Cola to deflect blame about its
products’ role in the rise in obesity and type 2 diabetes.102 In fact,
scientific evidence suggests that exercise has a minimal impact on
weight when compared with the food people consume.103 Coca-Cola
is assisting scientists in their advocacy by providing financial and
logistical support to a new nonprofit organization—the Global
Energy Balance Network—and donated approximately $1.5 million in
2014 to start the organization.104 The soda giant has consistently
characterized the obesity epidemic as an exercise problem (despite
scientific evidence to the contrary), but now is going one step further
by “enlisting” respectable scientists to advocate its case.105 Marion
Nestle sharply criticized Coca-Cola’s actions stating, “[t]he Global
Energy Balance Network is nothing but a front group for Coca-Cola.

97. O’Connor, supra note 11.
98. Id.
99. O’Connor, supra note 84.
100. See generally id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. “Barry M. Popkin, a professor of global nutrition at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, said Coke’s support of prominent health researchers was
reminiscent of tactics used by the tobacco industry, which enlisted experts to become
‘merchants of doubt’ about the health hazards of smoking.” Id.
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Coca-Cola’s agenda here is very clear: get these researchers to
confuse the science and deflect attention from dietary intake.”106
II. THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE (A/K/A, LOVE HANDLES)
The current health crisis has not gone unnoticed. Federal and local
governments are taking meaningful action to curb obesity rates in the
United States by targeting the food industry through updated
nutrition labeling requirements and soda taxes.
Noticing the
increased public concern and recent government action, some
companies are being proactive, pledging to reduce the sugar content
of their products. Beyond government and industry action, in 2003
consumers attempted to bring a private action against McDonald’s in
Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. in the Southern District of New York.
The legal community today may study this past attempt to impose
liability on a food company through obesity litigation—as well as the
successful litigation brought against tobacco corporations—to
develop a powerful and successful strategy for future litigation.
A. Federal Action: Lobbying and the Existing Revolving Door
One response to the growing health concerns related to
overconsumption of soda is increased government regulation of the
food and beverage industry. Interest groups, including the American
Beverage Association (“ABA”),107 as well as individual companies
such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi, invest significant time and money to
influence congressional and agency actions.108 Specifically:
The ABA has lobbied against any government action . . . that might
raise the cost of soda production and marketing or discourage
consumption . . . [including] against nutrition labeling, packaging
standards, fair labor standards, the exclusion of sodas from food
assistance programs and school meals, limitations on franchises,

106. Id.
107. The American Beverage Association is:
[T]he soda industry’s principal trade association, public relations agent, and
staunch defender . . . . The ABA represents dozens of beverage producers,
bottlers, distributors, franchise companies, and support industries, but
bottlers predominate, particularly those connected to Coca-Cola, PepsiCo,
and Dr. Pepper Snapple.” The ABA considers itself a neutral party and “a
liaison between the industry, government, and the public, and a strong voice
for the industry in legislative and regulatory matters . . . . The ABA lobbies
aggressively on behalf of the industry and weighs in loudly, forcefully, and
persistently on a broad range of issues affecting the soda marketing
environment.
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 98.
108. Id. at 315.
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quotas on sugar, container deposit laws, and restrictions on
television advertising to children, among other issues. 109

In the 2016 election cycle, the food and beverage industry
contributed over twenty-three billion dollars to campaigns, with
Coca-Cola as the top contributor with approximately $1.4 billion.110
In 2016, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and the ABA combined spent over twelve
billion dollars in lobbying.111 Among all the companies spending
money on lobbying within the food and beverage industry, CocaCola, Pepsi, and the ABA rank number one, two, and seven in
amount spent on lobbying.112 These figures show the soda industry
takes lobbying seriously, invests significant money into lobbying
efforts, and employs lobbyists or lobbying firms to “promote soda
interest to federal or state governments.”113 These lobbyists meet
with members of both houses in Congress, the White House, and
various government agencies integral in setting food-related
regulations including the USDA, Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”), and other federal agencies.114 Soda lobbyist groups will
reach out to government officials to voice the companies’ interest
when any issue or initiative that may affect soda production,
marketing, or profitability—regardless of how apparently indirect or
obscure—is considered.115
The food and beverage industry sends both its money and its
professionals into government, through the revolving door. A
revolving door describes a strong relationship between the

109. Id. (citing CHERYL HARRIS LOFLAND, THE NATIONAL SOFT DRINK
ASSOCIATION: A TRADITION OF SERVICE (1986)).
110. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Food & Beverage: Long-term Contribution Trends,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2016&ind=N01
[https://perma.cc/BGD5-WRVP].
111. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Food & Beverage:
Lobbying, 2016,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php
[https://perma.cc/8A9F-43JY].
112. Id.
113. These organizations and companies increase investment in lobbying when
particularly relevant issues arise within Congress or agencies. See, e.g., NESTLE, supra
note 2, at 317 (detailing Coca-Cola’s lobbying expenditures from 2008 to 2009 while
Congress was considering a soda tax). Additionally, the American Beverage
Association has spent millions of dollars challenging and opposing soda tax bills in
recent years. Roberto A. Ferdman, Why the Sugar Industry Hates the FDA’s New
Nutrition Facts Label, WASH. POST (May 20, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/20/why-the-sugar-industry-hates-the-fdas-newnutrition-facts-label/ [https://perma.cc/4E94-JKH3].
114. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 318.
115. Id. at 318-19.
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government agencies and the industries those agencies are intended
to regulate, wherein professionals continuously and seamlessly move
within the industry between the private and public sectors.116 Lester
Crawford, the head of the FDA, was formerly the Executive Vice
President of the National Food Processors Association.117 In 2006,
Lester Crawford pleaded guilty to “conflict of interest and false
reporting of information about stocks he owned in food, beverage,
and medical device companies he was in charge of regulating.”118
More generally, many Big Soda lobbyists formerly held positions
within government, as legislative aides, research directors, staff
assistants, or advisors to various governmental actors, ranging from
Members of Congress to key advisory roles within federal agencies.119
When former government officials become lobbyists, they bring “an
intimate knowledge of how the system operates, connections to
leaders and staff of both political parties, and a vast address book of
personal contacts accumulated on their jobs.”120
Such close
relationships present conflicts of interest when former government
officials use their familiarity with the system to further the interests of
the same industry they previously regulated.121 Within the revolving
door structure of the food and beverage industry, there is also the risk
that government agencies creating and enforcing regulations affecting
the food and beverage industry may become “captured” by these
professionals who previously worked for food or soda corporations,
and who may return to their former employees.122
From the significant spending on lobbying efforts, as well as the
revolving door effect creating a close and intimate relationship
between the food and beverage industry and governmental actors, it

116. Id. at 319.
117. Additionally, the Chief of Staff at the USDA was the former chief lobbyist to
the beef industry. These examples of a revolving door structure provide evidence of
regulatory agencies being controlled by the companies they are meant to regulate and
scrutinize. FOOD, INC., supra note 28.
118. Andrew Bridges, Ex-FDA Chief Pleads Guilty in Stock Case, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
10/17/AR2006101700573_pf.html [https://perma.cc/SU7L-JJB7].
119. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 319-20.
120. Id. at 320.
121. Id. at 319.
122. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 11 (“One of the scientists who was paid by the
sugar industry [to conduct research downplaying a link between sugar and heart
disease and promote saturated fat as the cause] was D. Mark Hegsted, who went on
to become the head of nutrition at the U.S.D.A., where in 1977 he helped draft the
forerunner to the federal government’s dietary guidelines.”). See generally FOOD,
INC., supra note 28.
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is clear that conflicts of interests can compromise effective policy and
regulation.123
B.

Successful Federal Regulation: The FDA Takes Action

In May 2016, the Food and Drug Administration took a big step
toward increased regulation in the interest of consumer protection
within the food industry by updating the Nutrition Facts label for the
first time in over twenty years.124 The new label requires packaged
foods to list the amount of sugar added by the manufacturer and the
percentage of the daily recommended consumption of added sugar
(see figure below).125

The FDA attempted to update the Nutrition Facts in 2014, but
faced strong opposition from General Mills and the Grocery
Manufacturers Association.126 Following the 2016 announcement, the
Grocery Manufacturers Association welcomed the new labeling

123. Documents from the 1960s demonstrated the significant role of the food
industry in recommending the American diet. See generally Ferdman, supra note
113.
124. See Lisa Baertlein, New U.S. Food Label Rules to Require Added Sugars to
be Detailed, REUTERS (May 20, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fdanutritionlabel-idUSKCN0YB1OF [https://perma.cc/YER6-TQ3S]; see also Ferdman,
supra note 113.
125. See Annie Gasparro & Mike Esterl, FDA Approves New Nutrition Panel
That Highlights Sugar Levels, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/fda-approves-controversial-changes-to-nutrition-facts-panel-1463750195
[https://perma.cc/NKY6-QQ3X].
126. See Dan Charles, An “Added Sugar” Label Is On The Way for Packaged
Food, NPR (May 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/05/20/478837
157/the-added-sugar-label-is-coming-to-a-packaged-food-near-you
[https://perma.cc/L2VQ-NLEE].

1286

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

requirements, while the Sugar Association criticized it, claiming it will
only confuse consumers and vilify the food and beverage industry.127
The updated labeling requirements will affect approximately 800,000
products ranging from Coca-Cola to yogurt and pasta sauce.128
Furthermore, updating the labels will cost food and beverage
manufacturers about two billion dollars, but is estimated to benefit
the consumer between twenty and thirty billion dollars by reducing
the costs of treating obesity-related health issues.129
Beyond the fiscal burden imposed on the manufacturers and food
and beverage industry by the new FDA labeling requirements, it is
unclear what effect the new labels will truly have on consumers’
purchasing and eating habits. Some advocacy groups and individuals
praise the labeling changes as a necessary development to enable
consumers to make more informed choices and to encourage food
manufacturers to reduce the amount of sugar used.130 The food
industry, however, emphasizes that added sugar and natural sugar
have the same effect on weight gain, and therefore distinguishing
between the two types of sugar through labeling is unnecessary and
will only confuse the consumer.131 Professor Jeremy Kees, a nutrition
label expert at Villanova University School of Business, concludes
that consumers respond more to front of package labeling changes,
and believes the impact of the nutritional label change will be
relatively small.132 Despite label placement, the contents of the labels
may have a particularly large impact on the soda industry—a twelve
ounce can of Coca Cola would show thirty-nine grams of sugar,
amounting to approximately 156 and 108 percent of a recommended
daily intake for women and men, respectively.133 Considering that
Coca Cola derives seventy percent of its sales from carbonated soft
drinks, the soda industry leader has significant stakes in how added
sugar is perceived in its products.134 The pressure from federal
127. Id.
128. See Baertlein, supra note 124.
129. In 2008, the annual medical cost of obesity was $147 billion. Id. Another
article indicates “[t]he FDA estimates that implementing the change will cost the
food and beverage industry roughly $500 million a year, while providing
approximately $2 billion annually in benefits such as reduced health costs, over 20
years.” Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125.
130. See Charles, supra note 126. Additionally, Marion Nestle, a professor of
nutrition and food studies at NYU, has called the FDA announcement a huge win for
the consumer. See Ferdman, supra note 113.
131. See Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125.
132. See Baertlein, supra note 124.
133. See Charles, supra note 126.
134. See Gasparro & Esterl, supra note 125.
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agencies may ultimately push the major food manufacturers to
reformulate their products and substantially reduce the amount of
added sugar.135
C.

Local Governments Take Action

Even if government action on the federal level may be ineffective
to enact meaningful change, cities have attempted to address the
health issues posed by excessive consumption of sugary soda
beverages in a number of ways. In 2012, New York City approved the
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule proposed by Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, a ban on sodas of a certain size.136 After a contentious
and well-publicized legal battle, the highest court in the state of New
York, the Court of Appeals, invalidated the ban.137 More recently,
Philadelphia became the first major United States city to pass a tax on
soda and other high-sugary beverages.138 Although California courts
upheld a similar provision in Berkeley for combating sugar
consumption from soft drinks,139 the Philadelphia soda tax is currently
being challenged in the Pennsylvania courts.140

1.

New York City Soda Ban

In May 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed
the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule and the New York City Board of
Health passed the rule in September 2012.141 The rule “prohibit[ed]
food-services establishments that are subject to the city’s health
department from selling sodas and other sugary drinks in containers

135. Id.
136. See Hery (Michelle) Min, Note, Large-Sized Soda Ban as an Alternative to
Soda Tax, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190 (2013).
137. See generally N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014).
138. See generally Michael Burke, Philadelphia Becomes First Major City to Pass
Soda Tax, USA TODAY (June 16, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2016/06/16/philadelphia-becomes-first-major-city-pass-soda-tax/85999128/
[https://perma.cc/4669-8BVT].
139. See Dan Charles, Berkeley’s Soda Tax Appears to Cut Consumption Of
Sugary Drinks, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/
23/491104093/berkeleys-soda-tax-appears-to-cut-consumption-of-sugary-drinks
[https://perma.cc/6L5R-TW9N].
140. See generally Dan Packel, Philly Defends Soda Tax Against Beverage
Groups’ Challenge, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/
850051/philly-defends-soda-tax-against-beverage-groups-challenge
[https://perma.cc/F7QS-CBKV]; Stephen St. Vincent, Is the Soda Tax Legal?, PHILA.
CITIZEN (June 15, 2016), http://thephiladelphiacitizen.org/is-philadelphia-soda-taxlegal/ [https://perma.cc/6WUT-DNT9].
141. Min, supra note 136, at 190.
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larger than sixteen ounces.”142
This type of restriction was
unprecedented in the United States, but it was ultimately struck down
by New York’s Court of Appeals.143 The court invalidated the ban on
two primary grounds. First, the court found that the New York City
Board of Health lacked the authority to impose the ban, because only
the legislative branch—in New York City, the City Council—has the
authority to make policy.144 The court explained that the ban was an
effort “to promote a healthy diet without significantly affecting the
beverage industry . . . . [t]he value judgments entailed difficult and
complex choices between broad policy goals—choices reserved to the
legislative branch.”145 Second, the ban was arbitrary and capricious,
largely due to its seemingly subjective exclusions.146 The current de
Blasio Administration was disappointed by the ruling,147 and reports
from 2014 indicated the administration was exploring other ways to
regulate large sodas.148 Although the de Blasio Administration held

142. See id. (citing Vivian Yee, Your Guide to New York’s Soda Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/your-guide-to-newyorks-soda-ban/ [https://perma.cc/J8WQ-3CQR]); see also Jill Colvin, New York

Soda Ban Approved: Board of Health Oks Limiting Sale of Large-Sized, Sugary
Drinks, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/

09/13/new-york-approves-soda-ban-big-sugary-drinks_n_1880868.html
[https://perma.cc/F3G9-RCFL]; Michael M. Grynbaum, Soda Makers Begin Their
Push Against New York Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/02/nyregion/in-fight-against-nyc-soda-ban-industry-focuses-on-personalchoice.html [https://perma.cc/Q6JK-4W49].
143. The New York Supreme Court invalidated the soda ban on two grounds—(1)
that the agency did not possess policy-making authority under Boreali and (2) that
the soda ban regulation was arbitrary and capricious. However, the First Department
of the New York Appellate Division only discussed the authority under Boreali, and
therefore the New York Court of Appeals specifically rejected the ban due to the
agency’s lack of authority to pass policy-making regulations. Rather, under Boreali,
policy-making is restricted to the legislative power. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517
N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).
144. See id.; see also Chris Dolmetsch, New York Big-Soda Ban Rejected by
State’s Highest Court, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-06-26/new-york-big-soda-ban-rejected-by-n-y-top-court-asoverreach.
145. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 547 (N.Y. 2014).
146. The regulation excluded some state-regulated businesses, such as convenience
stores, and did not apply to other high-sugary beverages. Dolmetsch, supra note 144;
see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 546, 560.
147. In response to news that the ban was improperly promulgated and would not
be reinstated “City Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito said lawmakers would
consider a ban on large soft-drink servings if de Blasio seeks one.” Dolmetsch, supra
note 144.
148. Michael Howard Saul, Forward Push on Soda Ban: De Blasio Administration
Considers New Ways to Cap Sugary Drinks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2014),
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“high-level” meetings with beverage industry executives and public
health advocates in 2014,149 no meaningful policy or legislation is
being pursued at this time.

2.

Philadelphia Soda Tax

In June 2016, Philadelphia became the first major city in the United
States to pass a soda tax.150 The Philadelphia City Council passed the
new tax by a thirteen to four vote, imposing a 1.5 cent per ounce tax
on sodas and other sugary beverages.151 Of note, this new soda tax
would be in addition to the eight percent sales tax already applied to
soda in Pennsylvania.152 The tax will impact both regular and diet
beverages,153 while milk, baby formula, and beverages that contain
over fifty percent fruit or vegetables are exempt.154 The tax went into
effect on January 1, 2017, and is expected to raise ninety-one million
dollars annually.155 According to Mayor Jim Kenney, the revenue
from this new tax will go back to communities with the greatest need
by expanding pre-kindergarten programs in the city, creating
community schools, and developing community resources, including
parks, recreation centers, and libraries.156
Although the tax passed with a clear majority in the City Council, it
was criticized and challenged throughout the process. The ABA

https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-mayor-bill-de-blasio-pushes-forward-onsoda-ban-1413421275 [https://perma.cc/9D7U-VDSL].
149. Id.
150. While Philadelphia is held out to be the first major United States city to pass
the soda tax, Berkeley, California was the first city in the United States to impose a
soda tax in 2014. Burke, supra note 138. Furthermore, attempts to pass similar soda
tax proposals have failed in over thirty states in recent years. Dann Cuellar,
Philadelphia City Council Passes Beverage Tax with 13-4 Vote, 6ABC NEWS (June 17,
2016), http://6abc.com/news/philadelphia-city-council-passes-beverage-tax-/1388228/
[https://perma.cc/EQY4-XMUM].
151. Burke, supra note 138.
152. Soda is classified as a food for taxation purposes, but is not exempt from sales
tax in the state of Pennsylvania. Jeanne Sahadi & Aaron Smith, Philadelphia Passes a
Soda Tax, CNN MONEY (June 16, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/16/pf/taxes/
philadelphia-passes-a-soda-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6RT9-AAS9].
153. Cuellar, supra note 150.
154. Tricia L. Nadolny, Soda Tax Passes; Philadelphia is First Big City in Nation to
Enact One, PHILLY.COM (June 16, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/
20160617_Philadelphia_City_Council_to_vote_on_soda_tax.html
[https://perma.cc/69DT-YR7X].
155. Sahadi & Smith, supra note 152.
156. Nadolny, supra note 154. While the health benefit motivations seem
apparent, Mayor Kenney focused on public interest issues when making the
argument to tax sugary drinks. He noted that any health benefits resulting from the
tax would be a bonus. Cuellar, supra note 150.
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spent nearly five million dollars on advertisements opposing the tax,
while a non-profit created in support of the initiative spent a little
over two million dollars.157 Critics of the tax emphasized its
regressive nature and claimed it was discriminatory and would
disproportionately impact poor and working class families.158 In
response, proponents emphasized the reinvestment of revenue raised
from the tax back into the city, ultimately lifting poor Philadelphians
out of poverty.159
The group Philadelphians Against the Grocery Tax and the
powerful ABA quickly took legal action against the tax,160 and Mayor
Kenney was prepared for the legal battle.161 The complaint alleged
that the Philadelphia soda tax was illegal, because (1) it violated
Pennsylvania’s conformity clause; (2) the tax was preempted by the
state’s power over sales tax and the soda tax on top of the sales tax
constituted illegal double taxation; and (3) the city cannot tax items
that may be purchased through SNAP [colloquially, food stamp]
benefits.162
Of the three claims, the strongest challenge to the tax is that the tax
is a sales tax and thus is preempted by state law.163 In Pennsylvania,
the state levies sales taxes, already taxes soda, and therefore the
additional city tax “runs counter to a state law preventing a local
government from taxing the same subject of property as an existing
state law.”164 The City contended that sales taxes are imposed on
tangible property and services, while the current soda tax “is levied
on the wholesale distribution of sweetened beverages when they

157. Of the two million dollars spent by the non-profit, $1.6 million came from
former New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, who is a strong proponent of
public health as it relates to soda consumption. In response to the successful passage
of the soda tax, Bloomberg congratulated Philadelphia Mayor Kenney and the City
Council for “standing up to the beverage industry.” Nadolny, supra note 154.
158. Burke, supra note 138.
159. Nadolny, supra note 154.
160. Burke, supra note 138.
161. Nadolny, supra note 154.
162. Claudia Vargas & Tricia L. Nadolny, Soda Tax Lawsuit Dismissed,
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20161220_Soda_
tax_lawsuit_dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/9ZUV-MCUP].
163. Packel, supra note 140.
164. Id. Arguing the soda tax is a sales tax is ultimately asserting a state
preemption argument. Because the state already imposes a sales tax, including a
sales tax on soda, “Philadelphia cannot legally impose a[n additional] sales tax
without approval from Republican dominated Harrisburg, which has often received
tax proposals coolly.” Ryan Briggs, A Legal Challenge to Soda Tax Pops Up, CITY &
ST. PA (June 8, 2016), http://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/legal-challenge-sodatax-pops [https://perma.cc/WL9H-9KJG].
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come into the city, is assessed based on volume, and is paid by the
distributor.”165 The City further asserted that any concerns that the
tax would eventually be passed on to the consumer are “legally
irrelevant.”166
The plaintiffs also claim that the tax violated Pennsylvania’s
Uniformity Clause. Article VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution
states, “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects,
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall
be levied and collected under general laws.”167 This clause requires
that goods belonging to the same class must be taxed at the same rate,
and the complaint alleged that the tax violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution because it is assessed on the volume, not the value or
price, of the item.168
The City responded that sugared and
unsweetened beverages are separate classes, and therefore the
uniformity clause did not apply.169 Furthermore, because the soda tax
is not a property tax, the City claimed it is within its right to tax the
beverages based on volume or quantity, rather than volume alone.170

165. Packel, supra note 140.
166. Id. While perhaps not legally relevant, the fact that the tax represents a
regressive tax that will disproportionately impact low-income residents certainly
represents a socially relevant concern asserted by critics, as noted above. Burke,
supra note 138.
167. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
168. Packel, supra note 140; St. Vincent, supra note 140. Plaintiffs’ Complaint
alleges the soda tax violates the uniform clause in four ways:
First, the Tax is imposed on the class of soft drinks in a non-uniform way
based solely on volume, not value—at both the distributor wholesale level
and the consumer market price level—in contravention of long-standing
precedent precluding such a non-value based method of calculation of taxes
on property (such as soft drinks). Second, the Tax is imposed on
distributors in an unequal and unreasonable way because the Tax is much
greater on large, inexpensive products than on small, more expensive
products. Third, the Tax is imposed on retailers in an unequal and
unreasonable way. Either the distributor passes on the Tax to the retailer,
or the retailer itself is responsible for payment of the Tax in the first
instance (a) pursuant to its role as a “dealer,” or (b) because the distributor
has failed to pay the Tax. Among retailers that sell affected beverages, the
retailers will suffer starkly different tax burdens depending on whether they
sell large, inexpensive products rather than small, more expensive products.
Fourth, the burden of the Tax is borne by consumers in unreasonably
disparate ways. The amount of the Tax borne by the consumer is less on a
percentage basis for small, more expensive products and wildly higher for
large, less expensive products.
Complaint at 5, Williams v. City of Philadelphia (Phila. Ct. C.P. 2016) (No. 1452).
169. Briggs, supra note 164.
170. Packel, supra note 140.
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The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas dismissed the plaintiffs’
case entirely, rejecting these arguments; however, the parties
challenging the tax quickly filed an appeal.171 While the soda tax has
been implemented throughout Philadelphia, its legality is still under
scrutiny. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has granted an
expedited appeal and arguments are expected to begin in early April
2017.172
D. Self-Regulation Within the Industry
Perhaps the growing public concern surrounding high-sugar
beverages, such as soda, exemplified by new FDA labeling
requirements and potential city taxation of soda beverages, has
prompted the industry to take action through self-regulation.173 On
October 17, 2016, Pepsi announced it would cut the sugar content and
calories of its products worldwide in response to the most recent
World Health Organization dietary guidelines.174 Specifically, Pepsi
plans to cut calories from added sugar to less than 100 calories in twothirds of its single serving drinks by the year 2025.175 The chairman
and CEO of Pepsi partially credited this new pledge to advances in
technology that will enable companies to make equally tasty products
without the same levels of sugar, resulting in “lower sweetness levels”
for the consumer.176 Pepsi did not indicate specifically which
products would be seeing the reduction in sugar content or how the
reduction would impact the production and marketing of the regular
Pepsi formula and, considering the wide range of products produced
171. Dan Packel, Pa. High Court To Hold Off On Philly Soda Tax Appeal ,
LAW360 (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/891541/pahigh-court-to-hold-off-on-philly-soda-tax-appeal [http://perma.cc/ZR2L-EHPJ].
172. Julia Terruso, Anti-Soda Tax Coalition Makes Appeal for Speedy Appeal ,
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/heardinthehall/Antisoda-tax-attorneys-make-appeal-for-speedy-appeal.html
[http://perma.cc/B92AWHWN].
173. See, e.g., Aubrey, supra note 1 (noting Dr. William Dietz’s observation that
big soda companies are under increasing pressure, some of it coming from taxation of
sugary drinks).
174. See Press Release, PepsiCo, PepsiCo Launches 2025 Sustainability Agenda
Designed to Meet Changing Consumer and Societal Needs (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.pepsico.com/live/pressrelease/pepsico-launches-2025-sustainabilityagenda-designed-to-meet-changing-consumer-a10172016
[http://perma.cc/2TWWJULG] [hereinafter PepsiCo Press Release]; see also Aubrey, supra note 1.
175. See PepsiCo Press Release. These products include Gatorade, Pepsi,
Mountain Dew, and Tropicana (among others). Abby Norman, Pepsi Will Cut the
Amount of Sugar in Its Sodas, & It’s a Small Step Forward, ROMPER (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.romper.com/p/pepsi-will-cut-the-amount-of-sugar-in-its-sodas-its-asmall-step-forward-20664 [http://perma.cc/FVR9-WG4M].
176. Norman, supra note 175.
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by Pepsi,177 the number of soda products impacted by the pledge
remains unclear.178 Pepsi’s announcement and sugar reduction
pledge is the first instance of a soda company taking potentially
meaningful steps to reduce the amount of sugar in its products. CocaCola and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group (along with Pepsi) pledged
to reduce the American caloric consumption of sugary drink by an
average of twenty percent by 2025 at the Clinton Global Initiative’s
annual conference in September 2014,179 but other than Pepsi’s 2016
announcement, no other company has made specific promises to
accomplish the goal of reducing sugar consumption through soda (or
other sugary beverages).180
E.

Consumer Product Liability Law

When regulations are inadequate to hold large corporations
accountable, citizens may become a sort of private attorney general
by bringing private suits against large companies for defective
products. One potential approach to challenging companies creating
unhealthy products is to file a civil claim under product liability law.
The Third Restatement of Torts assigns liability to manufacturers for
three types of product defects. First, the product manufacturer is
liable for injury caused by defects or production flaws, which occur
when “the product departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product.”181 The second is design defects, wherein “the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.”182 Manufacturers are ultimately liable for design defects,
because there is an element of the product that is inherently and
unreasonably dangerous.183 The final defect is in the information or
warning provided to the customer, or lack thereof.184 A manufacturer

177. Brands You Love, PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/brands [http://perma.cc/
5M8G-VLXR].
178. PepsiCo Press Release, supra note 174.
179. Saul, supra note 148.
180. While Coca-Cola and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group may have made vague
promises in 2014, Dr. William Dietz, a preventative health expert at George
Washington University, believed this announcement and pledge is a meaningful
commitment. Aubrey, supra note 1.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
182. Id.
183. Romero, supra note 4, at 245.
184. Id.
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is liable for warning defects “when products become unreasonably
dangerous because ‘no information explains their use or warns of
their dangers.’”185 If manufacturers include adequate labels properly
warning consumers of the potential dangers posed by the product,
then the product is considered reasonably safe.186 When assigning
potential liability to soda companies, the two relevant product
liability claims are design defect and failure to warn.
Courts have adopted a number of approaches when considering
design defects in product liability law. One approach is the consumer
expectation (or unreasonably dangerous) test where the court
determines a product’s design defect in relation to the consumer’s
expectation of safety.187 Under this analysis, a defectively designed
product is one which “at the time it leaves the seller’s hands [is] in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer [and] which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”188 Furthermore, the
defective product “must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.”189 A second approach is the risk-utility, or riskbenefit, test. This test “requires the trier of fact to weigh such factors
as the risks of harm, the benefits or utility of the chosen design, and
the burden of taking precautions against that harm, to determine
whether the product was unreasonably unsafe or dangerous in
design.”190 Some courts have adopted a hybrid test that “requires the
trier of fact to consider risk-benefit factors in deciding what a
reasonable consumer expects.”191
The other relevant defect in product liability law is failure to warn,
when the manufacturer fails to provide sufficient warning to the

185. Id. at 245-46.
186. Id. at 246.
187. JOHN S. ALLEE

ET AL., PROD. LIAB. § 2.05(2)(a) (2016); Mary Griffin, The
Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: Process Concerns in
Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively Designed Product , 73 CORNELL

L. REV. 606, 610 (1988).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
189. Id. For a food context, see, e.g., Austin v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 249 F.3d 805 (8th
Cir. 2001) (holding that hot chocolate was not an unreasonably dangerous product
when sold to consumers at 160 to 180 degrees Fahrenheit, which was the industry
standard).
190. ALLEE, supra note 187, at § 2.05(2)(b). While juries generally determine
questions of fact, the judge will consider the factors in the risk-utility test to
determine whether the plaintiff has a prima facie valid claim.
191. Id. at § 2.05(2)(c).
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consumer regarding the inherent risks of the product’s typical use.192
While “most courts have held that the basic standard of responsibility
is negligence and that the manufacturer’s duty is to use due care in
warning of dangers it ‘knew or should have known’ to exist,” a
number of other courts simply assume the defendants knew the risks
of harm, eliminating this requirement altogether.193 Some plaintiffs
have attempted to apply these product liability standards to food
products, but to little avail. Part III further discusses the potential
application of product liability to soda products.
F.

Obesity Litigation: Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.

In 2003, the Southern District of New York decided the seminal
case involving obesity litigation in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.194 In
Pelman, the plaintiffs, two minors and their parents on their behalf,
filed multiple claims against McDonald’s for allegedly causing them
to become obese, thus causing a multitude of health problems.195 The
plaintiffs filed five claims against McDonald’s. Counts one and two
alleged McDonald’s violated New York State consumer protection
law and engaged in deceptive trade practices by creating unhealthy
products, not fully disclosing the ingredients or health effects of
consuming the product, and using marketing to entice customers to
buy the products without disclosure of the risks.196 Count two
specifically criticized McDonald’s marketing to children.197 Plaintiffs’
counts three through five asserted negligence claims against
McDonald’s.198
Judge Sweet in his decision ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claims
for a variety of reasons. Counts one and two had alleged McDonald’s
violated the New York Consumer Protection Act.199 For a successful
claim of deceptive practices, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the act,

192. Id. at § 2.05(3).
193. Id.
194. See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The
Court considered these arguments during a procedural 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
195. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512.
196. Id. at 520, 527.
197. Id. at 520, 530.
198. Id. at 530.
199. Id. at 524. New York General Business Law § 349 makes “[d]eceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of
any service in this state” unlawful. Id. (quoting N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a)
(McKinney 2014)). New York General Business Law § 350 forbids “[f]alse
advertising in the conduct of any business.” Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (quoting
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350 (McKinney 2017)).
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practice or advertisement was consumer-orientated; (2) that the act,
practice or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and
(3) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the deceptive practice,
act or advertisement.”200 To determine whether an act or practice
was misleading, the court used an objective standard, demanding
evidence that a “reasonable consumer would have been misled by the
defendant’s conduct.”201 The court rejected count one, because the
plaintiffs did not identify a single instance of deceptive acts.202
Specifically, plaintiffs failed to identify an advertisement where
McDonald’s claimed that its products could be eaten on a daily basis
without any risk of health consequences.203 The court also rejected
the claims in count two, because the plaintiffs failed to present a
single specific advertisement, promotion, or statement targeting
minor consumers.204
In count three, plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s products were
inherently dangerous due to the high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt,
and sugar; however, McDonald’s defended its products by noting
public awareness of these nutritional facts.205 McDonald’s also
pointed to the Restatement (Second) of Torts emphasis that no
product can be entirely safe for all consumption.206 For plaintiffs’
200. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
201. Id. (citing Marcus v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1998); Oswego Laborers’
Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995)).
202. The plaintiffs identified only two potentially deceptive advertising
campaigns—“McChicken Everyday!” and “Big N’ Tasty Everyday”—and a
statement found on the McDonald’s website claiming that “McDonalds can be part of
any balanced diet and lifestyle.” Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
203. Id. at 528.
204. The Court noted that “if plaintiffs are only concerned about the appellation
‘Mightier Kids Meal,’ such name is seemingly puffery, rather than any claim that
children who eat a ‘Mightier Kids Meal’ will become mightier.” Id. at 530.
205. Id. at 531.
206. Id. at 531-32 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i, which
explains unreasonably dangerous: “The rule stated in this Section applies only where
the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all
consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only
from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil
found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by
‘unreasonably dangerous’ in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will
make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey,
containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
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count three to survive the motion to dismiss, it needed to “allege
either that the attributes of McDonald’s products are so
extraordinarily unhealthy that they are outside the reasonable
contemplation of the consuming public or that the products are so
extraordinarily unhealthy as to be dangerous in their intended use.”207
While the complaint alleged the food contains high levels of
cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar, the court found that it did not clear
the necessary bar.208 The court emphasized the common knowledge
that McDonald’s products contain these nutritional elements.209
The court then addressed plaintiffs’ count four, the failure to warn
of the unhealthy attributes of McDonald’s products. In evaluating
duty to warn claims, New York law considers the “feasibility and
difficulty of issuing warnings in the circumstances . . . ; obviousness of
the risk from actual use of the product; knowledge of the particular
product user; and proximate cause.”210 There are two situations that
bar a showing of proximate cause in duty to warn cases—obviousness
of the risk of harm and the knowledgeable user.211 Plaintiffs in
Pelman failed to allege that the McDonald’s products consumed by
the minors were dangerous in a way that was not “open and obvious,”
meaning “the risks were sufficiently obvious to the user without a
warning.”212 Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ count five, alleging
the sale of addictive products as overly vague, because it lacked
specific facts as to what about McDonald’s products makes them
addictive.213 Plaintiffs also failed to provide evidence suggesting
McDonald’s purposely created addictive products.214 Ultimately,
Judge Sweet granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in
its entirety, but granted leave for the plaintiffs to amend the
complaint to address the deficiencies identified within the opinion.215
Although the plaintiffs failed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in
Pelman, that does not mean that potential litigation against large food
or beverage corporations is not possible in the future. In fact, Judge

dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be
the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad
butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.”).
207. Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 540.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 541.
213. Id. at 542.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 543.
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Sweet’s decision in Pelman may have opened the door for litigation
by providing the precise information and evidence necessary for a
successful claim. First, if plaintiffs seek consumer protection claims,
they must present specific instances where the defendant corporation
or manufacturer created and disseminated deceptive advertising
expressly claiming its products were healthy for the consumer or
would actively assist the consumer lose weight. Second, plaintiffs will
face significant challenges bringing common law negligence claims
against fast food corporations, because it is well-known among the
public and consumers that such food is unhealthy and
overconsumption carries significant health risks. If consumers
attempt food litigation against the food and beverage industry, other
than specifically fast food restaurants, consumers should consider
whether the health risks are common knowledge. If, however, the
health risks are not well known, and have potentially been
downplayed by the food and beverage industry itself, consumers may
have a more persuasive claim than in Pelman.
G. Tobacco Litigation
Although recent consumer products liability claims against a fast
food corporation have been unsuccessful,216 consumers have
prevailed in claims against large corporations who create dangerous
products, specifically against tobacco and cigarette companies.
Tobacco litigation is now considered one of the successful mass tort
litigations brought against large corporations; however, this was not
always the case. Tobacco companies prevailed in the early cases
primarily because plaintiffs lacked sufficient scientific evidence
proving there was a link between their diseases and smoking
cigarettes.217 However, big tobacco’s early success came to an end in
the 1988 New Jersey case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.218 In
Cipollone, the jury awarded Antonio Cipollone $400,000 in damages
for the death of his wife, Rose Cipollone, who died from cancer

216. See generally id.
217. Douglas N. Jacobson, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How Wide Will
the Floodgates of Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1989).
Some plaintiffs failed in early tobacco litigation cases because plaintiffs had
contributed to their own health problems, while other plaintiffs simply could not
afford the lengthy and expensive court battles. See id. at 1022-23.
218. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d
Cir. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Jacobson, supra note 221,
at 1023. This was the first court to award a monetary judgment for injuries caused by
smoking cigarettes. Id.
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caused by smoking cigarettes.219 The jury found Liggett Group liable
because the cigarette company failed to warn consumers of the risks
of smoking before 1966 and breached its express warranty that the
cigarettes were safe.220 Cipollone was also the first case where
plaintiffs introduced evidence showing the cigarette companies
conspired to prevent third parties from providing information about
the health hazards cigarettes posed.221
Under strict product liability the plaintiff does not need to prove
that the defendants were negligent “or otherwise at fault for the harm
caused by the product.”222 Rather, the plaintiff must only prove that
“the manufacturer sold its product in a defective or dangerous
condition.”223 When determining whether the manufacturer in fact
sold a product that was in a defective or dangerous condition, many
jurisdictions have adopted the risk-utility test explained above.224
Specifically, in the cases preceding Cipollone, as well as the New
Jersey court in Cipollone, courts analyzed cigarette companies’
liability under a risk-utility analysis.225 The risk-utility test balances
the risks of the potentially dangerous products against the product’s
benefit to decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous or
defective. “Under [the] utility test the product is defective only if the
magnitude of the potential hazards outweighs the utility or other
benefits of the product.”226
In Cipollone, the plaintiffs asked the court to find that cigarettes
were so inherently dangerous and provided so little utility, that the
cigarette was a defective product.227 In so doing, the Cipollone court
219. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1023. As factual background, Rose Cipollone
began smoking cigarettes when she was sixteen and in 1981 developed a malignant
tumor in her right lung. Rose Cipollone had the upper lobe of her lung and then the
entire right lung removed. She and her husband filed a suit against the cigarette
companies who manufactured and sold the cigarettes she had smoked. The
complaint alleged that she developed bronchogenic carcinoma as a result of using the
defendants’ products for over forty years. During the pretrial procedures, Rose
Cipollone died of complications from lung cancer, and her husband, Antonio
Cipollone, continued the case individually and on behalf of his wife’s estate. Id. at
1043-44.
220. Id. at 1023. The failure to warn claim was prior to 1966, because warning
labels placed on cigarettes in 1966 in compliance with the FDA’s Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 preempted state tort claims. Id. at 1023, 1028.
221. Id. at 1023.
222. Id. at 1037.
223. Id. at 1039 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965)).
224. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1039.
225. Id. at 1036-40.
226. Id. at 1039-40 (citations omitted).
227. Griffin, supra note 187, at 607.
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analyzed the facts under the risk-utility test in a number of ways
under New Jersey Law.228 First, the court refused to “consider in [its]
calculus the collateral economic benefits from the manufacture and
sale of the product.”229 The court held that “the manufacturer’s
reasonableness in placing the product on the market depends only
upon the social benefits of cigarettes to the cigarette smoker, and not
upon the collateral social benefits of cigarette production.”230 The
second, more challenging piece of the risk-utility test was balancing
the utility of cigarettes against the risks associated with the product.
The court reasoned that a plaintiff could “prove a design defect in
two ways: (1) prove that the manufacturer was unreasonable because
it marketed the product as designed instead of using a technologically
feasible alternative; or (2) when no technologically feasible
alternative is available, prove the manufacturer was unreasonable in
selling the product at all.”231 While both analyses compare the
defendant’s alternative course of conduct, the second approach is
quantifiably more difficult for a court to determine.232 Comparing a
specific product to a technologically feasible alternative—such as a
prior product model, or a new feasible alternative—provides the
court quantifiable data and evidence to compare, such as increasing
the cost of a product in order to add a certain safety feature.233
However, a court comparing an existing product against a
hypothetical world without the product must consider an
overwhelming number of competing values without any quantifiable
data to compare.234

228. Under New Jersey tort law, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for design
defect are evidence that (1) the product design was defective, (2) the defect existed
when the defendants distributed the product, and (3) the defect caused injury to a
reasonably foreseeable user.” Id. at 609.
229. Id. at 611-12. For example, “[i]n analyzing the utility of the handguns the
court considered only the utility of such handguns to the consumer for recreational
use or protection, and not production benefits resulting from handgun manufacture
or sale.” Id. at 612 (citing Moore v. R.G. Indus., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986)).
230. Griffin, supra note 187, at 613.
231. Id. at 615 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150
(N.J. 1979) (“Did the manufacturer act as a reasonably prudent person by designing
the item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition, or should he have
designed it to incorporate certain safety features or some other modifications?”)).
232. Griffin, supra note 187, at 615.
233. Id. at 615-22.
234. Notably:
When the plaintiff posits the removal of an entire product line from the
market, the court cannot focus on one small, incremental change at a time.
The court can no longer, for example, hold constant the price and relaxation
benefits of cigarettes and focus solely on the tradeoff between a bitter
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The Cipollone court also considered the failure to warn claim.235
The defendants argued that this claim was preempted because
Congress had passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965, requiring cigarettes to contain a warning label by 1966.236
The United States Supreme Court held that the failure to warn claim
was preempted for injuries occurring after the 1966 label was
implemented, and the plaintiff was limited to injuries predating the
federal warning.237 Despite this limitation, the “jury found Liggett to
be negligent and assigned 20% of the fault for Cipollone’s illness to
the defendant,” and held the plaintiff eighty percent responsible for
her injuries through the assumption of risk doctrine.238
Shortly after Cipollone, the climate of tobacco litigation changed
significantly. Plaintiffs began consolidating claims to create classaction tort challenges to the tobacco industry.239 Beyond plaintiffs’
private causes of action, states began “seeking reimbursement from
tobacco companies for health-related costs associated with
smoking.”240 These developments occurred as industry documents

aftertaste and reduced health risks. The ‘should not have sold any cigarettes
at all’ alternative brings all the defendants’ design choices into the fray at
once.
Id. at 621-22.
235. As the court summarized:
The ‘failure to warn claims’ allege both that the product was ‘defective as a
result of [respondents’] failure to provide adequate warnings of the health
consequences of cigarette smoking’ and that respondents ‘were negligent in
the manner [that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted and advertised’
their cigarettes. The ‘express warranty claims’ allege that respondents had
‘expressly warranted that smoking the cigarettes which they manufactured
and sold did not present any significant health consequences.’ The
‘fraudulent misrepresentation claims’ allege that respondents had willfully,
‘through their advertising, attempted to neutralize the [federally mandated]
warning’ labels, and that they had possessed, but had ‘ignored and failed
to act upon,’ medical and scientific data indicating that ‘cigarettes were
hazardous to the health of consumers.’ Finally, the ‘conspiracy to defraud
claims’ allege that respondents conspired to deprive the public of such
medical and scientific data.
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1992).
236. See generally id. The required warning label read: “WARNING: THE
SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETERMINED THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING
IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH.” Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2012).
237. Jacobson, supra note 217, at 1046.
238. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512; see also Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the
Next Tobacco? Lessons Learned from Tobacco for Obesity Litigation , 15 ANN.
HEALTH L. 61, 86 (2006).
239. Courtney, supra note 238, at 85.
240. Id.
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surfaced and revealed efforts to “conceal and misrepresent tobaccorelated health concerns,” and that tobacco industry executives knew
of nicotine’s addictive nature.241 Using this newly discovered
evidence, plaintiffs shifted their focus to the addictive qualities of
tobacco.242 While the tobacco and cigarette companies previously
claimed that the health risks associated with smoking cigarettes were
well-known to the consumer (especially after the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act) and therefore consumers assumed
those risks when they voluntarily chose to smoke,243 “the addictive
character of nicotine was less familiar to smokers than the health
effects of tobacco.”244 In addition to shifting the focus to nicotine
addiction, state attorneys general began bringing state health care
reimbursement claims, beginning with the Mississippi Attorney
General.245 Mississippi and the other states sought recovery on
equitable grounds of unjust enrichment, as well as “consumer fraud
and violations of consumer protection law.”246
Soon, similar
government lawsuits were filed by almost every state, and the tobacco
industry avoided significant litigation by settling individually with
four states and settling with the remaining forty-six states in a $206
billion master settlement agreement in 1998.247
III. THE BITTER TRUTH OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
American consumers should pursue two courses of action to hold
soda companies accountable for their role in the current obesity and
health crisis. First, following the litigation against tobacco and
cigarette companies, consumers should pursue product liability civil
actions. Second, consumers should pursue legislative action on the
local and state levels to encourage cities and states to adopt a per

241. Id. at 87 (citing Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation,
in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 179, 183 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 2001)).
242. Courtney, supra note 238, at 86-88.
243. See supra note 236. In addition to requiring warning labels on cigarette
packages, the act “specified in great detail the appropriate phrasing of warnings,
requirements for outdoor billboards, and appropriate size fonts for each warning.
Armed with the statute, Big Tobacco repeatedly won cases asserting that the smoker
knew that the habit was dangerous and voluntarily chose to smoke knowing the
risks.” John J. Zefutie, Jr., From Butts to Big Macs – Can the Big Tobacco Litigation

and Nation-Wide Settlement with States’ Attorneys General Serve as a Model for
Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1383, 1388-89 (2004).
244. Courtney, supra note 238, at 87 (citing Rabin, supra note 241, at 186).
245. Id. at 88.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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ounce tax on beverages, particularly soda, that contain over fifty
percent sugar, using the recently upheld Philadelphia soda tax as a
model. Both civil actions and local legislation may ultimately
encourage other companies to respond to public health concerns and
modify their products to make them healthy, just as Pepsi is
promising to do.
The current public health crisis surrounding obesity and diabetes
presents a costly and dangerous problem for American society
today.248 Despite the recent development of new FDA labeling
guidelines requiring the disclosure of “added sugars,” it is unclear
how effective or responsive Congress or federal agencies will be in the
future. Federal agencies may be unable to create and enforce
meaningful regulation, because companies in the food and beverage
industry, as well as special interest groups (such as the ABA), are
willing to pay exorbitant amounts of money in lobbying and campaign
contributions to protect their interests, which do not align with
increased regulations.249 Furthermore, as long as there is a revolving
door between private and public sector employees, where industry
insiders hold positions within federal agencies, the agencies
themselves may be ineffective in regulatory action.250 Rather,
individuals should serve as private attorneys general and hold Big
Soda companies accountable through the courts. Given the difficulty
plaintiffs have faced in the past regarding obesity litigation brought
against fast food restaurants, cities and states should take local action
to reduce obesity, diabetes, and other related health issues, by
imposing a soda or sugary beverage tax.
A. Renewed Litigation Efforts: No Sugar-Coating
Litigation brought against food and beverage corporations, and
specifically large soda companies, on the basis of sugar
overconsumption may prove more successful than obesity litigation
brought strictly against fast food restaurants.251 Plaintiffs should use
the success in tobacco litigation to make a claim of design and

248. See Romero, supra note 4, at 241; see also NESTLE, supra note 5, at 393.
249. See discussion supra Section II.A.
250. See discussion supra Section II.A.
251. There are many avenues through which consumers can hold Big Soda
accountable for creating and selling such unhealthy products. Although the plaintiffs
failed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in Pelman, potential litigation against large food
or beverage corporations may still be possible. In fact, Judge Sweet’s decision in
Pelman may have opened the door for litigation by providing the precise information
and evidence necessary for a successful claim. See generally Pelman v. McDonald’s
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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warning defects against large soda companies.252 Of the two claims,
the failure to provide sufficient warning claim is likely stronger than
the design defect claim, but both offer potential approaches to pursue
litigation.

1.

Design Defect

The design defect claim exists when “the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.”253 For a successful design defect claim,
plaintiffs must first show that consumer soda posed a foreseeable risk.
Once the plaintiffs have demonstrated this foreseeable risk existed,
they must show the existence of a reasonable and safe design that the
soda companies should have pursued and used. Specifically, plaintiffs
would claim that soda companies could have created a formula with
less sugar, thereby reducing the health risks of consuming the
product.
Soda companies are likely aware of the dangers posed by
consuming large amounts of sugar254 and, therefore, would be attuned
to the foreseeable risks posed by high-sugar content sodas. Because
sugar comprises a significant portion of the soda formula, plaintiffs
should target the dangers inherent in sugar consumption and
overconsumption. As discussed in Parts I and II, there is significant
evidence pointing to sugar as one of the—if not the—primary causes
of obesity and diabetes.255 After carbonated water, high fructose corn
syrup is the largest ingredient in most regular (non-diet or sugar-free)
sodas, including Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Sprite, and Dr. Pepper.256
Furthermore, because it delivers fructose in a liquid form, sodas
present a uniquely dangerous product.257 When sugar, specifically
fructose, is consumed in liquid form, the fructose rushes to the
liver.258 Consuming fructose in liquid form exacerbates the health

252.
253.
254.
255.

See Romero, supra note 4.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998); supra Section II.E.
See O’Connor, supra note 84; see also O’Connor, supra note 11.
NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405-06, NESTLE, supra note 2, at 66; see generally
GARY TAUBES, THE CASE AGAINST SUGAR (2016).
256. COCA-COLA, supra note 78; PEPSICO, supra note 78; Dr Pepper, DR. PEPPER,
http://www.drpepper.com/en/products/drpepper
[https://perma.cc/5A36-557R];
Sprite, COCA-COLA, http://www.coca-colaproductfacts.com/en/coca-cola-products/
sprite/ [https://perma.cc/SCA6-9QCS].
257. See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.
258. Taubes, supra note 1; FED UP, supra note 51.
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risks that already exist with typical sugar consumption because it
overloads the liver, forcing it to convert the fructose into fat, which
can induce insulin resistance.259 Insulin production can then cause
obesity, metabolic syndrome, and a number of related adverse health
conditions.260
A notable challenge in the design defect argument is that, despite
some calls that sugar is a toxin in any amount,261 recent experts have
emphasized that sugar ingestion is particularly harmful when it is
over-consumed.262 Even if sugar is considered a toxin analogous to
tobacco or alcohol, it would not constitute a toxin for product liability
purposes under existing tort law.263 So long as design defect tort law
is limited to products that contain true “toxic” materials and the soda
serving-size remains within the bounds of the “healthy” daily sugar
intake, design defect claims will likely prove futile. If the original
product at issue is not considered harmful, then there would be no
reason for the company to pursue a safer alternative. Even if the
court found that a single serving of soda was harmful, plaintiffs may
nevertheless have difficulty pursing a design defect claim because of
the balancing inquiry required by the risk-utility test.

2.

Failure to Warn

Plaintiffs should investigate three different avenues for a duty to
warn claim against soda companies. The first is that sodas are
scientifically addictive based on their ingredients. Second, plaintiffs
should encourage courts to adopt an expanded duty-to-warn standard
for practical addiction where the scientific evidence is still being
developed. Finally, plaintiffs should allege that due to the large
amount of sugar in a serving of soda, the beverage companies had a
duty to warn the consumer about the risks of consuming large
amounts of sugar.

259. See discussion supra Section I.B; see generally JOHN YUDKIN, PURE, WHITE,
DEADLY: HOW SUGAR IS KILLING US AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT
(1986).
260. “[Dr. Robert Lustig’s] argument . . . is that sugar has unique characteristics,
especially in the way the human body metabolizes the fructose in it . . . that may
make it singularly harmful, at least if consumed in sufficient quantities.” Taubes,
supra note 1 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i. (see also supra note
206 and accompanying text).
AND
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There is developing evidence that soda may be addictive.264 Sugar
is the largest ingredient in soda after carbonated water. As such,
evidence that sugar possesses addictive qualities should imply that
sodas containing large amounts of sugar would be similarly addictive.
While “sweetness is well established to reinforce the desire to eat,”265
the debate surrounding whether sugar is addictive is controversial and
still developing.266 Researchers have studied the potential for sugar
addiction by comparing sugars with other abusive drugs.267 Unlike
traditional substance abuse, the effects of sugar addiction may not be
as visible or immediate.268 Scientific evidence shows that sugar
induces the same response in the brain’s reward center as nicotine,
cocaine, heroin, and alcohol, all substances known to cause
addiction.269 A critical question for determining scientific addiction is
what differentiates a substance that triggers the reward center causing
pleasure from a substance that is addictive, and what results when a
substance is both.270 In 2007, French scientists compared sugar and
cocaine cravings in rats,271 and found that “[r]ats given sweetened
water in experiments find it significantly more pleasurable than
cocaine, even when they’re addicted to the latter, and more than
heroin as well.”272 Furthermore, scientists addicted rats to cocaine
over the course of months and then offered the addicted rats a sweet
solution or its cocaine fix; it only took two days for the rats to choose
the sweets over the cocaine.273
264. See generally NESTLE, supra note 2, at 64-65.
265. Id. at 49.
266. While “[s]ugar craving does seem to be hard-wired in our brains,” the debate
may ultimately be whether sugar is actually addictive or whether society just treats it
as such. TAUBES, supra note 255, at 33, 37. But this begs the question of whether
scientific addiction should be distinguished from practical addition when the
company knowingly creates the product.
267. Id. In fact, sweet and sugary beverages are sometimes used to wean addicts
off harder drugs. Id. at 41.
268. Critically:
[S]ugar appears to be a substance that causes pleasure with a price that is
difficult to discern immediately and paid in full only years or decades later.
With no visible, directly noticeable consequences . . . questions of ‘long-term
nutritive or medical consequences went unasked and unanswered.’ Most of
us today will never know if we suffer even subtle withdrawal symptoms from
sugar, because we’ll never go long enough without sugar to find out.
Id. at 34.
269. Id. at 40.
270. Id. at 41.
271. Magalie Lenoir et al., Intense Sweetness Surpasses Cocaine Reward, 2 PLOS
ONE 8, 1 (2007).
272. TAUBES, supra note 255, at 41.
273. See id.
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Research into the addictive qualities of sugar is ongoing and may
take years to develop hard-scientific evidence, especially because
human studies are scarce or non-existent. Nevertheless, the current
evidence paints a picture of likely addiction, similar to that of illicit
drugs. Soda not only contains high levels of likely addictive sugar, but
also contains caffeine, which is known to be addictive.274 Again, there
is currently little known research to scientifically answer whether soda
is addictive. However, given the strong evidence of addictive
qualities of sugar, compounded with the known evidence of caffeine
addiction, there is sufficient suggestion to give courts pause before
dismissing such claims. For plaintiffs to pursue a successful failure to
warn claim, they must show that the defendant was aware of the risk
and did not disclose this information to the consumer. Therefore,
plaintiffs would need some reason to believe and prove that internal
research within the food and beverage industry exposed evidence that
soda (or substantial ingredients in soda, such as sugar) is addictive.275
Beyond scientific addiction, plaintiffs and courts should expand
failure to warn claims to practical addiction because soda formulas
are created to specifically bypass certain neurological signals to
encourage overconsumption. Soda formulas are carefully created and
manipulated to ensure that no single flavor overpowers the
consumer’s palate.276 This effect enables the consumer to drink more
soda, because she does not “get sick” of the flavor. Additionally,
because soda is a liquid, the brain may not receive the psychological

274. Notably:
Addiction researchers are especially interested in sodas because they
contain another potentially addictive substance, caffeine, as well as sugars.
The caffeine in sodas is low—less than 40 milligrams in a 12-ounce serving—
but that may be enough to stimulate dependence, especially in combination
with sugars . . . . The caffeine is there for a different purpose [than taste]; it
makes people enjoy drinking the product even more than does sugar on its
own. At least one study found that the addition of even small amounts of
caffeine to sugary drinks makes people drink more of them.
NESTLE, supra note 2, at 49 (citing Russell S. J. Keast & Lynn J. Riddell, Caffeine as
a Flavor Additive in Soft Drinks, 49 APPETITE 255, 255-59 (2007); Russell S. J. Keast
et al., Caffeine Increases Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption in a Free-Living
Population: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 113 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 366, 366-71
(2015)).
275. Courts should look at the addition of caffeine, a known addictive substance, to
soda to determine whether the caffeine serves any legitimate purpose other than to
enhance the soda-drinking experience. Id.
276. MOSS, supra note 55, at 105.
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regulatory signal that it is full.277 Calories from soda are more than
empty calories—they are dangerous calories containing fructose that,
due to the liquid form, can overwhelm the body’s metabolic system.278
Furthermore, even though the body just consumed nearly sixty
percent of the daily value of sugar by drinking one twelve ounce
serving of soda, it does not think it is full and therefore will likely seek
additional sustenance to feel satiated.279 This additional sustenance
will almost certainly contain more sugar. Ultimately, by consuming
soda, the body is deceived and unknowingly consumes nearly sixty
percent of its recommended daily sugar value without feeling full.
This entire scenario certainly encourages, and likely directly leads to,
overconsumption of sugar on a daily basis. Again, plaintiffs will have
to prove that the industry is aware of these risks; however, given the
fact that food products are intentionally created to promote
consumption, and soda companies are aware of the amount of sugar
in each serving, the industry is, or should be, aware of the potential
for practical addiction that likely results in sugar overconsumption.280
The final failure to warn argument does not depend on a claim of
scientific or practical addiction, but it points to the health risks
associated with sugar. The Pelman plaintiffs asserted a general failure
to warn about the health risks associated with food products, but the
court rejected the claim that McDonald’s failed to warn consumers
about the dangers of eating too much of its fast food products, by
emphasizing that the reasonable consumer is aware of the inherent
danger in eating fast food.281 Unlike the danger of consuming foods
high in fat and cholesterol, the public is less knowledgeable about the
dangers of consuming sugar. In fact, many Americans likely do not
know how much sugar they should consume on a daily basis.282 The

277. “Most research suggests that it is only the sugars consumed in drinks that
bypass physiological regulatory controls.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 46; see also supra
Sections I.A, I.B.
278. Taubes, supra note 1, and accompanying text; FED UP, supra note 51.
279. In humans, studies have shown that “the more sugary drinks people consume,
the more calories they consume from any source.” NESTLE, supra note 2, at 45-46.
280. See generally MOSS, supra note 55, at 98-99, 104-06 (discussing how sodas are
created to encourage “heavy usage”).
281. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding
the risk associated with eating a large amount of fast food was sufficiently obvious to
not require a warning).
282. Until recently, nutrition labels were not required to include the daily value
percentage for sugar consumption. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
Furthermore, the average American consumes far more sugar than recommended by
various health authorities, suggesting consumers are not aware of the risk of
overconsumption. See discussion supra Part I.
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limited knowledge is due, in large part, to the sugar industry’s active
campaign to shift focus from the role of sugar to the role of fat in
causing various health concerns (concerns that are now becomming
associated with sugar).283 Unlike the developing research into
whether sugar is addictive, soda companies should have been well
aware of the risks posed by consuming sugar,284 but they did not
disclose this information to the public in any form. Rather, the soda
companies sought to change the conversation and encourage a
reduction of all calories, a reduction in fat consumption, and an
increase in activity.285
In Pelman, the court held that the failure to warn claim failed
because of the well-known health risks associated with eating fast
food on a regular basis.286 The same cannot be said for the dangers
associated with consuming sugar.
While it may be common
knowledge that sugar consumption should be modified to some
extent, until the new FDA labeling requirements are implemented
and widely understood, the general public is likely unaware of how
much someone should consume on a daily basis. Furthermore, there
is clear evidence that the food industry sought to redirect attention
and criticism from sugar to fat.287 Through a winning public relations
campaign, the sugar industry successfully changed the narrative to fat
as the evil cause of obesity and related health problems.
Proving causation presents a major challenge to litigation against
soda companies. In Pelman, Judge Sweet identified the plaintiffs’
inability to prove that the McDonald’s products, rather than other
foods or lifestyle choices, caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.288 Similarly, it
would be nearly impossible to identify regular soda as the individual
cause of an individual’s health problems (such as obesity or diabetes).
Most notably, sugar (and added sugar) is found in most processed
foods, so it would likely be impossible to separate the sugar from the
product at issue in litigation from the sugar in other foods. The best
potential approach to causation is the market share liability approach

283. See O’Connor, supra note 11 (explaining how the Sugar Association paid
scientists in the 1960s to promote saturated fat as the main cause of heart disease,
thus downplaying the developing research suggesting a strong link between sugar and
heart disease); see also O’Connor, supra note 84.
284. Throughout the 1960s, British nutrition authorities did a series of experiments
exposing the dangers of consuming sugar and published a criticism of sugar called
“Sweet and Dangerous.” Taubes, supra note 1.
285. O’Connor, supra note 84.
286. Id.
287. O’Connor, supra note 11.
288. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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developed in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.289 Under the market
share liability theory, plaintiffs who are unable to identify a single
manufacturer, through no fault of their own, can sue multiple actors
who produced the injurious product, and the industry actors pay
damages based on their share of the market.290 Soda litigation,
however, still fails to meet certain requirements necessary for market
share liability. First, unlike the Sindell cases, sodas are unlikely to be
considered fungible goods, because each soda company likely uses a
different, highly protected formula.291 Additionally, because soda can
cause a number of related health problems later in life, plaintiffs
would be unable to demonstrate a “signature illness” associated with
soda consumption.292 Even assuming plaintiffs could demonstrate
they only consumed soda from one producer, thereby ignoring the
market share liability argument, they would face the same causation
challenges illustrated in Pelman and would likely face dismissal.293
B.

Sweet Success: Increasing Local and State Government Action

Consumers and legislatures should encourage and support soda, or
high-sugar beverage, taxes at the local and state levels.294 The federal

289. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). In Sindell, due to the delayed adverse impact of a
medicine, plaintiffs were unable to identify the specific manufacturer who had
created the specific pills they consumed. Rather than find in favor of defendants, the
court adopted a new theory of market share liability, wherein all manufacturers who
created the dangerous product could be held partially liable for the resulting injury.
See generally Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981).
290. Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 289, at 673-77.
291. Cf. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926 (“DES was produced from a common and
mutually agreed upon formula as a fungible drug interchangeable with other brands
of the same product; defendants knew or should have known that it was customary
for doctors to prescribe the drug by its generic rather than its brand name and that
pharmacists filled prescriptions from whatever brand of the drug happened to be in
stock.”); see also Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (finding
market share liability inapplicable to lead paint cases, because paint formulas vary
and therefore paint was not a fungible good). Furthermore, even if plaintiffs
attempted to identify sugar as the specifically harmful element of soda, the sugar in
processed foods can be different combinations of pure cane sugar, glucose, fructose,
etc. See Taubes, supra note 1.
292. See generally Sindell, 607 P.2d 924.
293. No reasonable person could find probable cause based on the facts in the
complaint without resorting to “wild speculation.” Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 538
(citing Price v. Hampson, 142 A.D.2d 974, 975-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (ruling on
causation as matter of law as jury could find causation only by engaging in “wild
speculation.”)).
294. “[T]ax policies were demonstrably effective in discouraging cigarette
smoking . . . . [and r]esearchers published systematic reviews arguing that taxes on
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government has considered the implementation of local and state
soda taxes and, in 2010, the White House Obesity Task Force
recommended an analysis of the effect of state and local taxing on
“energy-dense” foods, including sodas.295 Two years later, health
advocates found the evidence against soda “so compelling that more
than one hundred groups and individuals called on [the Department
of] Health and Human Services to produce a Surgeon General’s
report on soda consumption equivalent in authority to the Surgeon
General’s reports on smoking.”296 A number of counties and now
one major city in the United States have already passed such an
initiative, either through legislation or referendums.297
Berkeley, California, was the first city to adopt a soda tax in 2015,
and recent studies show promising data that this type of tax may be
successful in reducing or curbing high-sugar soda beverage
consumption.298 The data illustrates that low-income neighborhoods,
areas where there is higher soda and sugar consumption rates, as well
as higher rates of obesity and diabetes, have seen a decrease in soda
consumption as high as twenty-one percent.299 Just south of the
United States border, Mexico passed a national sugary beverage tax
in 2014300 and after one year saw the sale of sugary beverages
decrease twelve percent.301 In response to these promising results,
“[p]ublic health authorities hailed the findings as the first hard

sugary drinks were justified historically and would produce substantial economic
benefits, along with improvement.” NESTLE, supra note 5, at 405.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Charles, supra note 139; see also Alexandra Sifferlin, Mexico’s Sugary
Drink Tax is Working, Study Suggests, TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/
4168356/mexico-sugar-drink-soda-tax/ [https://perma.cc/D8NA-WBPX].
298. See Charles, supra note 139.
299. See id.; see also Yasmin Anwar, Soda Tax Linked to Drop in Sugary Beverage
Drinking in Berkeley, BERKELEY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016), http://news.berkeley.edu/
2016/08/23/sodadrinking/ [https://perma.cc/VR2E-8K2P]. One significant criticism of
the Philadelphia soda tax is that it is a regressive tax, meaning it disproportionately
affects and harms low income individuals. While this may be a valid characterization
of the tax, it may be a necessary evil. Low-income communities are more likely to
consume larger amounts of sugar and, furthermore, have relatively high risks of
obesity and diabetes. NESTLE, supra note 2, at 35-36, 185-86. Perhaps it is not entirely
negative that these taxes will discourage low-income individuals from consuming this
harmful and largely unnecessary product.
300. “In January 2014, Mexico implemented an excise tax of 1 peso per liter for
sugar-sweetened beverages as a way to cut down on the country’s growing obesity
epidemic.” Sifferlin, supra note 297.
301. Anahad O’Connor, Mexican Soda Tax Followed by Drop in Sugary Drink
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/mexicansoda-tax-followed-by-drop-in-sugary-drink-sales/ [https://perma.cc/5SC8-JZFD].
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evidence that a nationwide tax could spur behavioral changes that
might help to chip away at high obesity rates.”302 Although the
immediate data shows decreases in soda and sugary-beverage
consumption, it will likely take many years to see if the sugary
beverage taxes show any impact on obesity rates or the health risks
associated with obesity. But this fact should not discourage increased
soda tax initiatives throughout the United States.
The recent court decision in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County303 should also encourage consumers and local
and state legislatures to adopt and expand soda tax initiatives. As
explained in Part II, Philadelphia was the first major city in the
United States to adopt a soda tax, 1.5 cents per ounce for sodas and
other sugary beverages.304 Shortly after the Philadelphia City Council
passed this groundbreaking legislation, a group of Philadelphia
residents, businesses, and industry associations challenged the tax as
allegedly violating the Pennsylvania Constitution, as preempted by
the state’s taxing power, and as taxing an item under SNAP
benefits.305 The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas rejected
plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the case in its entirety.306 Because the
uniformity clause may be unique to Pennsylvania’s Constitution, the
court’s rejection of this argument likely bears little influence on
subsequent taxes or legal battles that may ensue.
The court’s rejection of the preemption claim and SNAP benefits
claim, however, could extend beyond Pennsylvania. The court’s
dismissal is a major blow to the ABA and likely represents a viable
future for soda, or high-sugar beverage, taxes moving forward.307
302. Id. Notably, “Mexico’s obesity epidemic has attracted worldwide attention.
Of the 34 developed countries that are members of the O.E.C.D., Mexico has the
highest rate of adults who are overweight or obese—about 70 percent—and the
highest rate of Type 2 diabetes. It also has the highest per capita intake of soft
drinks, which account for 70 percent of the total added sugars consumed by the
average Mexican.” While all socio-economic groups saw a decline in soda sales, the
decrease was greatest among those people of low-income, who saw a seventeen
percent decrease in consumption. Id.
303. Opinion & Order, Williams v. City of Philadelphia (Phila. Ct. C.P. 2016) (No.
1452).
304. Burke, supra note 138.
305. Vargas & Nadolny, supra note 162.
306. Id.
307. The plaintiffs have a right to appeal the court’s opinion. The president of the
Pennsylvania Food Merchants Association indicated that the industry coalition
challenging the tax would appeal the court’s ruling. Scott Calvert, Judge Dismisses
Lawsuit Against Philadelphia Soda Tax, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-philadelphia-soda-tax1482181175 [https://perma.cc/YG24-5L8V].
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Specifically, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the soda tax was
preempted by the state’s sales tax, “because the two taxes are
fundamentally different.”308 Sales taxes are levied at the point of sale,
while the soda tax is to be levied at the point of distribution.309
Although the plaintiffs alleged that the distributors are likely to pass
some of the tax burden onto the consumer, thus effectively creating a
sales tax, Judge Glazer found that argument was “not relevant” and
what matters is how the tax “operates, not what private actors will do
in response to the tax to offset the burden of the tax.”310 Ultimately,
because the tax is collected from the distributor, it does not matter
whether that burden is then shifted to the consumer. The court also
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “cities or states are barred from
taxing items that are purchased with federally funded food stamps
under . . . SNAP.”311 By rejecting these two arguments that could be
brought by other states where soda taxes are implemented, the court
signaled that soda taxes burdening beverage distributors could be
upheld as a separate tax from sales taxes and are not preempted by
the states’ power to levy a sales tax.
Even without the court victory for Philadelphia’s soda tax
legislation, momentum from the success of the Philadelphia soda tax
has been gaining.312 In November 2016, residents in four counties
passed ballot measures to impose a soda tax.313 San Francisco,
Oakland, and Albany counties in California passed a referendum to
308. Vargas & Nadolny, supra note 162.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Judge Rejects Lawsuit to Stop Philadelphia Soda Tax, CSP DAILY NEWS
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.cspdailynews.com/category-news/beverages/articles/
judge-rejects-lawsuit-stop-philadelphia-soda-tax [https://perma.cc/Y3Q4-36M8].
312. Aubrey, supra note 1. Of note, the soda industry has reportedly reserved
nearly $9.5 million in airtime ad buys aimed at defeating the initiative in San
Francisco.
313. See Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, Passage of Four Soda Tax Measures Deals
Major Blow to the Beverage Industry, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/2016/11/09/passage-of-four-sodatax-measures-deals-major-blow-to-the-beverage-industry
[https://perma.cc/8T653TQB]:
In California, San Francisco’s Measure V passed with 61.87% of the vote,
Oakland’s Measure HH received a winning 60.75% of the vote,
and Albany’s Measure O1 was approved with 70.67% support. All three
California measures will tax sugary drinks at a penny-per-ounce. Voters
also approved a fourth soda tax measure, 2H, on the ballot in Boulder,
Colorado with an unofficial 54.01% of the vote. The Boulder tax will be the
largest of the four, adding two-cents-per-ounce to a variety of sugary
beverages.
Id.
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levy a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages.314 Residents in Boulder,
Colorado passed the highest soda tax, imposing a two cent per ounce
tax on distributors of soda and other sugar-sweetened beverages.315
Many have hailed the November 2016 results as a victory over the
soda industry and, given the success in California, Colorado, and
Philadelphia, more local governments should pursue similar
regulations or voter referendums in the near future.316
Expanding soda taxes to more cities and states will create multiple
positive results for the consumer. First, these taxes thus far have
resulted in a decrease in soda consumption,317 even if the taxes are
not created to burden the consumer. It will be years before research
or studies can be conducted to show what effect a decrease in soda
consumption may have on obesity and diabetes rates but, until those
studies are conducted, public health advocates should celebrate the
decreased consumption of a beverage that ultimately encourages
daily overconsumption of sugar. Beyond the direct effect of a
potential decrease in soda consumption, revenue from soda taxes can
be used to fund much-needed public programs, as the Philadelphia
mayor emphasized.318 In addition to the local effect of the tax,
instituting these taxes throughout the country could put pressure on

314. See Heather Knight, S.F., Oakland, Albany Voters Pass Soda Tax, SFGATE
(Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Sugar-tax-measure-results10593882.php [https://perma.cc/C5Y6-LTFK]. For the San Francisco ballot measure,
see San Francisco, California, Soda and Sugary Beverages Tax, Proposition V
(November 2016), BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco,_California,
_Soda_and_Sugary_Beverages_Tax,_Proposition_V_(November_2016)
[https://perma.cc/J4B7-TN6L].
For the Albany ballot measure, see Albany,
California, Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax, Measure O1 (November 2016),
BALLOTOPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Albany,_California,_Sugar-Sweetened_
Beverage_Tax,_Measure_O1_(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/U944-GA9L].
315. Alex Burness, Boulder Passed the Nation’s Steepest Soda Tax; Now, to
Implement It, DAILY CAMERA:
BOULDER NEWS (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_30593248/boulder-passed-nationssteepest-soda-tax-now-implement/ [https://perma.cc/5U38-HDZL].
316. Winston Cho, Oakland Celebrates Soda Tax Victory as “Huge Win Over
Corporations,” E. BAY EXPRESS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/
SevenDays/archives/2016/11/09/oakland-celebrates-soda-tax-victory-as-huge-winover-corporations [https://perma.cc/WQ2N-73A6]; Huehnergarth, supra note 313.
317. See Anwar, supra note 299; Charles, supra note 139; O’Connor, supra note
301.
318. The Philadelphia soda tax is “expected to bring in $91 million to fund pre-K,
community schools, parks and recreation systems and the city’s fund balance.” Claire
Sasko, Judge Dismisses Anti-Soda Tax Lawsuit, PHILLY MAG. (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/12/19/court-dismisses-soda-tax-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/8ZJA-8PP4].

2017]

BIG SODA

1315

private beverage companies to take action to modify their current
high sugar formulas and create healthier products.319
Pepsi’s pledge to reduce sugar in its products over the next nine
years may represent the result of mounting pressure to reduce sugar
in the American diet. However, American consumers have seen
apparent self-regulation within the food industry before and during
Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign.320 In response to
Michelle Obama’s initiation of the program to combat childhood
obesity, the food companies announced proactive measures to show
cooperation with the Obama Administration, by reducing the total
number of calories they sell annually.321
However, the food
companies did not pull the unhealthy products from the shelves, but
rather created “healthier” alternatives, such as low-calorie or fat-free
products.322 These alternatives could prove to be more harmful than
healthier ones, because when a food company removes fat from its
product, it generally replaces that fat with sugar, thus reducing the
amount of fat or calories in a product but increasing the amount of
sugar.323 Pepsi’s pledge directly targets sugar and therefore may
represent meaningful self-regulation, but it will be important to see
what products are chosen for sugar reduction. Although Pepsi
pledged to reduce the sugar content in two-thirds of its products,
Pepsi owns and controls a large number of food brands, and therefore
could reduce the amount of sugar in products with already low levels

319. See Aubrey, supra note 1.
320. See discussion supra Section II.D.
321. In 2010, Michelle Obama announced, “I am thrilled to say that [the processed
food industry has] pledged to cut a total of one trillion calories from the food they sell
annually by the year 2012, and 1.5 trillion calories by 2015.” MOSS, supra note 55, at
256; see also FED UP, supra note 51.
322. See MOSS, supra note 55, at 256 (observing that “[t]he math of all this is less
compelling . . . ”). Furthermore, in creating these “healthier” products with less fat,
the companies generally add more sugar. See also FED UP, supra note 51.
323. See Edward Malnick, Jasper Copping & Matthew Payton, Low Fat Foods
Stuffed with “Harmful” Levels of Sugar, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/10668189/Low-fat-foods-stuffed-withharmful-levels-of-sugar.html
[https://perma.cc/7GRV-P5R4]
(explaining
that
products designated as “low fat” or “fat free” contained large amounts of sugar).
These proactive measures may have only been a way to redirect the public health
conversation from nutrition and food to increasing exercise. It is imperative to note
that “[i]n the months just prior to Mrs. Obama’s speech [announcing the Let’s Move
campaign was shifting its focus to increasing exercise], the food industry has
succeeded in delaying federal standards for marketing foods to children, and defeated
proposals to tax sodas.” At the time of the Let’s Move campaign and subsequently,
government agency attempts to enact anti-obesity measures were met with
“systematic and heavily-funded industry opposition.” NESTLE, supra note 5, at 392.
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of sugar while keeping the Pepsi—or other sugary beverage
formulas—the same.
A more meaningful pledge would be a commitment to reduce or
cap sugar content in all products, as Kraft proposed in 2003. Kraft is
one of the largest food producers and, in 2003, proposed an initiative
that would cap the amount of salt, sugar, and fat that food scientists
and brand managers could add to new products.324 Again, this
proposal only applied to new products and not products currently in
circulation; however, the motivation behind adopting this policy was
to begin decreasing the salt, sugar, fat, and calorie values of its entire
thirty-five billion dollar portfolio.325 Whether Kraft is also committed
to removing known unhealthy products from the shelves remains
unclear, but the initiative certainly demonstrates an awareness of
their potential culpability in the obesity crisis and “wanting to do the
right thing by consumers.”326 Whether industry self-regulation is
genuine or superficial, increased local action, such as imposing soda
taxes in more cities and states throughout the country, will continue
to challenge the powerful food and beverage industry in the fight for
public health.
CONCLUSION
The food and beverage industry—especially the soda companies—
has gone too long without having to take responsibility for its role in
the current public health crisis affecting individuals everywhere. The
soda companies created an unhealthy product with a dangerous
amount of sugar without regard to the potential health risks that
could ensue. Furthermore, the food and beverage industry helped
create and totally exploited the information vacuum that shifted the
blame for health problems from sugar to fat,327 or even away from an
unhealthy diet altogether.328 The result is an uninformed public
consuming dangerously unhealthy soda products on a daily basis
without the proper disclosures about the associated risks.
Changing this status quo is long overdue. Because large-scale
federal regulations will likely prove ineffective,329 ultimately
consumers should challenge the soda industry through local
government. To date, six cities in the United States have adopted a

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

MOSS, supra note 55, at 255.

Id.
Id.
See O’Connor, supra note 11.
See O’Connor, supra note 84.
See discussion supra Section II.A, Part III.
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soda tax either through city council ordinances or voter referendums,
demonstrating a significant blow to Big Soda.330 Furthermore, as the
2015 soda tax in Berkeley, California demonstrates, a soda tax may
significantly reduce soda consumption.331 If more cities continue to
adopt these health-conscious economic policies, it may put sufficient
pressure on food and beverage companies to take meaningful
proactive steps to reduce the sugar content in their products and help
curb the United States’ obesity and diabetes epidemic.332

330. See discussion supra Sections II.C, III.B.
331. Charles, supra note 139.
332. The most recent example is Pepsi’s pledge to reduce the amount of sugar in
two-thirds of its products by 2025. See Jeff Daniels, PepsiCo Pledges to Slash
Beverage Calorie Counts by 2025, CNBC (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/
2016/10/14/pepsico-pledges-to-slash-beverage-calorie-counts-by-2025.html
[https://perma.cc/M3QY-B2C4]. Although no other large food companies have made
a similar pledge, if consumers pursue private and public actions, additional
companies may feel pressured to take action to avoid either legal liability, increased
government regulation, or bad public relations that may hurt commercial value.

